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For many products such as cars, electronic appliances and furniture, the price
that a customer pays is negotiated from the posted price. In such transactions,
negotiation plays an important role in determining whether a customer purchases,
and if so, at what price. We know all too well how common negotiation is when
buying a car or other “big-ticket” items such as furniture and home appliances.
Perhaps surprisingly, negotiation is becoming a more acceptable practice even at
retailers selling small-ticket items. For example, two reporters from The Wall Street
Journal who negotiated at 50 retail stores during the holiday season of 2001, were
successful in getting a discount off the posted price at 18 of these stores for products
ranging from a personal digital assistant ($20) to a fitness machine ($50) (Agins and
Collins, 2001). The stores at which they got discounts range from Eddie Bauer to
Sunglass Hut, from Kenneth Cole to Salvatore Ferragamo.
A retailer may want to adopt negotiation because negotiation allows retailers to
price discriminate among customers with heterogenous willingness-to-pay, compared
to traditional posted pricing strategy. However, negotiating the price with customers
often comes at a cost, which possibly offsets the benefit generated from price discrim-
ination. This becomes the key trade-off for retailers when considering whether to use
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negotiation as a sales format or not. We have seen in many cases, different retailers
use different sales formats when they sell the same product. In September 2007,
Lithia Automotive Group, the eighth-largest dealer chain in the U.S., selling vehicles
from all major manufacturers and brands (ranging from Porsche to GM to Toyota),
announced that it would convert all of its 108 stores to haggle-free pricing within
the next three years (Welch, 2007). Of course, many competing dealers will stick
to the time-honored tradition of bargaining. Different sales format co-exist in other
retail settings as well. For example, a store like Costco will sell home appliances or
electronics at the posted prices without any room for a haggle, while consumers can
successfully negotiate for such items at smaller discount stores such as Big George’s
in southeast Michigan. Furthermore, it has been recently reported that major re-
tailers (including BestBuy, Home Depot, and Circuit City) are allowing their sales
people to negotiate with customers. In fact, the cash registers at BestBuy are set up
so that the final price can be reset at the time of check out (Richtel, 2008). All of
these examples suggest that retailers actively decide whether to use negotiation or
posted pricing.
In cases where a retailer has chosen to use negotiation, the starting point for ne-
gotiation will be the product’s posted price or the sticker price chosen by the retailer.
In many cases, retailers adjust the posted price during the selling season. For exam-
ple, electronics stores such as Best Buy or Circuit City change the posted price of
high-tech products since these products are outdated quickly. Likewise, department
stores and “style goods” apparel retailers (such as Kenneth Cole and Sunglass Hut)
frequently change the posted price during the course of the season. One reason these
retailers turn to dynamic price adjustments is the difficulty of inventory replenish-
ment during the selling season coupled with the drastic depreciation of product value
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once the season is over. For example, it is well known that many apparel retailers
face long replenishment lead times since most items are produced off-shore, which
precludes the possibility of further replenishment during the short selling season of
fashion items. (See, for example, Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994.) Therefore, adjust-
ing price in response to sales helps these retailers improve their revenue from the
limited inventory available. Such “dynamic pricing” practices may push the price
up or down depending on the inventory level of the product and the remaining time
in the selling season. Negotiation, on the other hand, tends to drive the price up,
so that the retailer has more room to negotiate the price. Thus, when determining
the price, the effects of dynamic pricing and negotiation may combine together or
oppose one another. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we investigate the interaction
between dynamic pricing and negotiation. We analyze if negotiation is more or less
beneficial to the retailer in the presence of dynamic pricing, and how such benefits
are influenced by inventory level and the length of the selling season.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effect of negotiation on the retailer, using a dynamic
model of pricing decisions. However, the sales format that a retailer chooses not only
determines the retailer’s profits, but also influences the profits of the parties in a sup-
ply chain, in particular, the manufacturers who provide the goods sold by the retailer.
In Chapter 3, we focus on the supply chain implications of the retailer’s sales format
choice. A retailer’s decision to negotiate or not is driven by its self-interest, and the
effect of this decision on a manufacturer’s profit is unclear. In particular, the sales
quantity, and therefore the quantity that the retailer orders from the manufacturer,
are likely to be different between the two sales formats. Hence, the manufacturer
would like to influence the retailer’s sales format choice through the terms of trade.
There are many ways in which the manufacturer can influence the retailer’s deci-
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sion, and even for a simple contract like the wholesale-price-only contract, it is not
clear how the manufacturer’s decision drives the retailer’s choice. For example, as
wholesale price increases, thereby increasing the manufacturer’s unit profit margin,
does the retailer come closer to using negotiation or posted pricing? In Chapter 3
of this dissertation, we answer such questions and highlight how the manufacturer’s
wholesale price promotes (or discourages) one sales format over another and what
sales format and price choices may arise in equilibrium. The sales format choice –
negotiation or posted pricing – may be even more critical in the presence of tight
capacity constraints in the supply chain. Hence, Chapter 3 pays special attention
to the effect of supply chain capacity on the equilibrium sales format, pricing and
quantity decisions.
1.1 Overview of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 of the dissertation discusses how negotiation and revenue management
interact so as to influence the retailer’s revenue. A stochastic dynamic programming
formulation is employed to embed a negotiation model in a more traditional dynamic
pricing model. We consider a retailer who has limited inventories at the beginning of
a relatively short selling season. In our model, the outcome of negotiation between
the retailer and the customer depends on the retailer’s inventory, the remaining time
in the selling season and the price posted by the retailer.
This model produces a number of interesting analytical and numerical results. As
one would expect, the optimal posted price of a negotiating seller includes a premium
over that of the seller using take-it-or-leave-it pricing strategy. This price premium
helps the seller extract more revenues from a bargainer with a high reservation price,
and, surprisingly, peaks at moderate inventory levels. As the negotiating seller adds
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a price premium, some customers will be worse off when buying from the negoti-
ating seller (compared to buying from the seller using take-it-or-leave-it pricing).
Nonetheless, we show that a group of bargainers with low reservation prices benefit
from negotiation, in particular when the price premium is high. As expected, ne-
gotiation helps improve the seller’s revenue, especially when inventory level is high.
More surprisingly, we find that negotiation can act as a substitute or complement
to dynamic pricing. For example, at moderate inventory levels, the benefit from
dynamic pricing increases further when the seller can negotiate.
1.2 Overview of Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we consider a supply chain has limited capacity and the retailer in
the supply chain chooses one of two pricing regimes, posting a fixed price or negotiat-
ing, when selling to customers who are heterogeneous in their willingness-to-pay. The
generalized Nash bargaining solution is employed to further explore the bargaining
power of both the customer and the retailer, and determine the negotiation outcome
where the customer and the retailer reach an agreement. We analyze the retailer’s
quantity and pricing regime decisions as well as the manufacturer’s inducement of
a pricing regime via the wholesale price. We pay special attention to the effect of
capacity and negotiation cost on the equilibrium outcome. In addition, we analyze
how the retailer’s discretion to pick the sales format influences the manufacturer’s
profit.
We find that three types of equilibria may arise, depending on the cost of negotia-
tion and the capacity of the supply chain: When the cost of negotiation is sufficiently
low and the manufacturer’s capacity is sufficiently high, the supply chain ends up at
a negotiation equilibrium, which is the same as the equilibrium that would arise if
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negotiation is the exogenous sales format. When the cost of negotiation is sufficiently
high and the manufacturer’s capacity is sufficiently low, the supply chain ends up at
a posted pricing equilibrium, which again coincides with the equilibrium that would
arise if posted pricing is the exogenous sales format. In between these two, at mod-
erately high negotiation costs and capacity levels, the supply chain may settle at a
different equilibrium. In this region, the manufacturer would prefer the retailer to
use negotiation, but must offer the retailer a discounted wholesale price to induce
such an outcome. This leads to a number of interesting observations: A retailer with
a higher cost of negotiation may earn more in equilibrium than a retailer with a
lower cost of negotiation, because the manufacturer concedes some profit margin to
the high-cost retailer in order to induce it to use negotiation, when such a sacrifice
is not needed when working with a low-cost retailer.
CHAPTER 2
Interaction between Negotiation and Revenue
Management
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, many retailers adjust posted prices dynamically, and
some customers are able to negotiate discounts from these posted prices. Both dy-
namic adjustment of posted prices (hereafter, dynamic pricing) and negotiation are
used by many retailers to increase the revenue, particularly when the inventory is
limited. Although both strategies are used to improve the retailer’s revenue, there
are differences in how each one achieves this goal. Dynamic pricing adjusts the mar-
gin based on the inventory level relative to the remaining selling season: The posted
price will increase when inventory is low, and will decrease when inventory is high.
On the other hand, negotiation enables the retailer to extract more revenue from in-
dividual customers: The firm can set a high posted price, and those customers with
high willingness-to-pay may buy the product after little or no negotiation, while oth-
ers with low willingness-to-pay will buy at discounted prices after negotiating with
the retailer. Therefore, the retailer chooses a high posted price in order to improve
the range of price discrimination enabled by negotiation.
Depending on the inventory level, negotiation and dynamic pricing can drive the
7
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posted price in the same or opposite direction. When there is little inventory of the
product, the retailer’s tendency to set high posted prices under negotiation will be
reinforced by dynamic pricing. On the other hand, if the risk of excess inventory at
the end of the season is significant, then dynamic pricing drives the posted price down
to move the product faster, but such low posted prices reduce the retailer’s ability
to price discriminate via negotiation. These interactions among dynamic pricing,
negotiation, and inventory motivate our research, which fills a gap in the literature
by considering the joint use of dynamic pricing and negotiation.
In this chapter, we propose a model where negotiation and dynamic pricing take
place together. We consider a seller who has limited inventory at the beginning of
a relatively short selling season. We divide the season into periods, each of them
short enough so that at most one customer can arrive in a period. The customer
population is comprised of two types of consumers — price-takers and bargainers.
Price-takers either buy at the posted price or quit without purchasing. On the other
hand, bargainers initiate a negotiation in the hope of getting a discount from the
seller. We assume that (as in most retail settings) negotiation typically happens over
a short time span (sometimes a matter of minutes) within which the seller and the
bargainer exchange a limited number of offers and counter-offers. At the end of the
negotiation, one would expect to see many different outcomes: The bargainer may
successfully negotiate a discount (the size of which may vary), end up buying at the
posted price, or quit without purchasing.
We develop a negotiation model that assumes a limited number of exchanges
while capturing the negotiation outcomes mentioned above: the bargainer makes an
offer that is countered by the seller, which the bargainer either accepts or rejects. The
bargainer’s offer depends on the posted price (which affects the bargainer’s beliefs
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about the seller’s valuation of the product). On the other hand, the seller’s counter-
offer depends on the bargainer’s offer, the inventory, and time until the end of the
selling season.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a survey
of the relevant literature. Section 2.3 outlines our model where a negotiation model
is embedded into a dynamic pricing problem. In this section, we characterize the
outcome of negotiation as a function of posted price, inventory level, and remaining
time. In Section 2.4, under certain distributional assumptions on reservation prices,
we derive analytical results regarding the optimal posted price. We then describe
the results of our numerical study in Section 2.5. We conclude in Section 2.6. All
proofs are provided in Appendix A.
2.2 Literature Review
There has been a significant volume of research in dynamic pricing of limited
inventories in the last decade. Starting with Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), and
Bitran and Mondschein (1997), this research focuses on products whose inventory
cannot be replenished during their relatively short selling season, and the key ques-
tion is how the seller should adjust the price of the product based on remaining time
and inventory in order to maximize the total revenue over the selling season. For
recent reviews of the literature, see Bitran and Caldentey (2003), and Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak (2003). As the use of dynamic pricing has spread from airline and
travel industries to the retail industry, researchers have studied many different dy-
namic pricing problems that correspond to specific business applications, such as
dynamic pricing for multiple products (e.g., Zhang and Cooper, 2005, and Maglaras
and Meissner, 2006), dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers (e.g.,
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Aviv and Pazgal, 2005, Elmaghraby, Gulcu and Keskinocak, 2006, Su, 2007, and
Zhou, Fan and Cho, 2006), the use of dynamic pricing and discounting when mak-
ing product offers to customers (e.g., Netessine, Savin and Xiao, 2006, and Aydin
and Ziya, 2006) and dynamic pricing when the demand in each period is affected
by prices over multiple periods (e.g., Popescu and Wu, 2006, and Ahn, Gumus and
Kaminsky, 2007). However, the existing work on dynamic pricing has not considered
retail situations where the customer can initiate a negotiation on the price of the
product. Our contribution is to investigate the interaction between dynamic pric-
ing and negotiation, and to analyze the effect of negotiation on the seller and the
consumers in a setting where prices are adjusted dynamically.
In the majority of the existing work on dynamic pricing, a common assumption
is that a customer, upon arrival, will observe the current price chosen by the seller,
and if the customer purchases the product, she will buy at the posted price. Some
of the more recent work on dynamic pricing makes alternative assumptions in this
regard. For example, in most of the work regarding dynamic pricing in the presence
of strategic consumers, the customer decides when and/or at what price to purchase.
Nevertheless, while customers purchase at a price/time of their choice, the customer’s
choice is still limited to the prices posted by the seller in the course of the season.
In contrast, in our model, the customer observes the posted price chosen by the
seller and may make an offer to start the negotiation process. The posted price,
inventory level of the seller and the time remaining in the selling season all influence
the eventual outcome of the negotiation, i.e., whether the customer will buy and at
what price.
Another research topic closely related to our model is bargaining, which has
been studied extensively in economics. For a detailed review of the theory and
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applications of bargaining, see Muthoo (1999). Two classic bargaining models in
economics are the Nash bargaining solution and the Rubinstein model. Under the
Nash bargaining solution, two parties bargaining over a surplus split the difference
between the total surplus and the sum of their reservation utilities (also known as
disagreement payoffs). The Nash bargaining solution does not specify an explicit
bargaining procedure leading to this outcome. One interpretation is that two fully
rational parties make simultaneous offers. The Rubinstein model, on the other hand,
views bargaining as a series of alternating offers between two parties bargaining over
a surplus. In its most basic form, the Rubinstein model assumes that the two parties
have full information regarding each other’s utilities and they make alternating offers
with a fixed time interval between two successive offers to maximize discounted
utility. This bargaining process leads to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where
the parties immediately settle at the very beginning of the bargaining process. The
equilibrium of the Rubinstein model yields the Nash bargaining solution when the
time interval between two offers approaches zero (or discount factor approaches one).
There has been a wealth of further research in economics focusing on the bargaining
between buyers and sellers. Among them, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) analyze a
bargaining model where the buyer and seller have incomplete information about each
other’s valuations of the product and make simultaneous offers. Farrell and Gibbons
(1989) consider the same model as Chatterjee and Samuelson with one difference:
A party can use cheap talk prior to bargaining, which influences the other party’s
belief regarding the first party’s valuation of the product.
While the bargaining models in economics are attractive and have many applica-
tions, they do not provide an appropriate framework for the retail environment we
seek to model since they primarily concentrate on the outcome of one buyer and one
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seller negotiating over one unit of an item. In our dynamic pricing problem, however,
the seller with limited inventory will sell to multiple buyers who arrive at different
times in the course of selling season. Thus, the seller’s valuation changes over time as
the remaining time, and inventory fluctuate during the selling season. In our model,
the seller reacts to this fluctuation by adjusting the posted price, which precedes
the bargaining between the seller and buyers. Furthermore, the posted price influ-
ences the buyer’s belief on the seller’s valuation of the product and the surplus over
which the buyer and the seller are negotiating. Thus, existing bargaining models
are not well-suited to articulate the effects of inventory, time and the posted price
on bargaining. In this chapter, we propose an alternative bargaining model that is
well-suited to our purpose of modeling negotiation in the presence of inventory con-
siderations. This model is simple enough to be embedded into the dynamic pricing
problem, but sophisticated enough to capture a spectrum of bargaining outcomes we
observe in practice.
There are a few papers in economics that compare posted-price strategy with
bargaining. One such paper is by Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) who show that posted-
price strategy is superior to haggling if the seller incurs a cost for bringing a new
potential buyer. Wang (1995), on the other hand, uses the Nash bargaining solution
to model the outcome of bargaining, and finds that bargaining is always preferable to
take-it-or-leave-it pricing if the cost of implementing bargaining is not too high. Both
papers ignore the effect of limited inventory and finite selling season, thus the risk
of excess inventory as well as the risk of shortage are ignored. Our model explicitly
considers a seller with limited inventory and a finite selling season, thus capturing
these important risks that the seller needs to bear.
There is some recent work that incorporates negotiation among supply chain
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partners. For example, Wu (2004) uses the Rubinstein model to search for coordi-
nating contracts in a supply chain with demand uncertainty. Gurnani and Shi (2006)
use the Nash bargaining solution in order to model a contract design problem in a
supply chain where the supplier’s reliability is private information. Iyer and Villas-
Boas (2003) consider bargaining issues in distribution channels. Dukes and Gal-Or
(2003) consider the relationship between advertisers and media outlets, using the
Nash bargaining solution to model the negotiation outcome. Nagarajan and Sosic
(2008) review and extend the research in cooperative bargaining in supply chains.
There are also papers that examine bargaining as a pricing strategy. Desai and
Purohit (2004) analyze how two competing retailers choose whether to use take-it-
or-leave-it pricing or negotiation and analyze equilibrium outcome. Terwiesch, Savin
and Hann (2005) analyze an online retailer that uses a negotiation process where
customers name their own prices, and derive the retailer’s optimal threshold price
above which the retailer accepts all offers. None of this work models supply-side
constraints, which we do through our focus on the limited inventory of the product.
2.3 Model Description and Negotiation Results
We consider a firm selling a limited inventory of a product over a predetermined
selling season. We assume that the selling season is divided into T periods, each of
which is short enough that at most one customer arrives in a given period, and we
denote the probability that a customer arrives in a period by λ ∈ [0, 1]. A customer
can be one of two types - a price-taker or a bargainer. Let q be the proportion of
bargainers in the customer population. Facing two types of customers, the seller
sets the posted price and negotiates with bargainers in each period to maximize his
expected total revenue over the selling season.
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2.3.1 Customer’s Problem
Let r denote the reservation price of the customer (the maximum price that the
customer is willing to pay for the product), unobservable to the firm. From the
firm’s perspective, an arriving customer’s reservation price is a non-negative random
variable Rc with a cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (·) and a probability
density function (pdf) f(·). We assume that F is defined over the domain [0,b] for
some 0 < b ≤ ∞. Define F (·) := 1 − F (·). Throughout the chapter, we define
x+ := max{0, x}.
Upon arrival, all customers observe the posted price, but their subsequent be-
havior depends on their type. A price-taker buys the product if the posted price, p,
is less than or equal to her reservation price, r, and quits otherwise. On the other
hand, a bargainer observes the posted price and decides whether to negotiate or quit.
We assume that the bargainer’s offer is restricted to be within θ of the posted price,
where θ > 0 can be interpreted as the largest discount a customer will demand.
Therefore, only bargainers with reservation price of p − θ or higher will proceed to
negotiate; others will quit without making an offer. If θ is sufficiently large, most
bargainers will choose to negotiate whether or not the posted price is high (e.g.,
Oriental rug store). On the other hand, if θ is small, many bargainers will choose
to quit since they will not be able to negotiate the price down to the level they can
afford (e.g., home appliances). If the bargainer decides to negotiate, she will make
an offer, po, and the seller will respond with a counter-offer, pc, that depends on the
seller’s inventory and time as well as the bargainer’s offer as we will discuss later.
Then, the customer either accepts the counter-offer (if r ≥ pc) or rejects (if r < pc).
The inclusion of θ in our model reflects the fact that bargainers will not make
unrealistically low offers. Although we assume that all bargainers have the same
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θ > 0, note that the price-takers in our model can be seen as customers with θ = 0.
Therefore, in effect, our model allows two heterogeneous types of customers with
different bargaining skills. One could extend the model to allow for n types of
bargainers, each with a different θi, i = 1, . . . , n, but many of our insights will remain
the same.
How does a bargainer decide what offer to make? One could model this decision
in different ways, depending on how much the bargainer knows about the seller’s
problem. If the bargainer knows all the relevant information about the seller’s prob-
lem, which includes the seller’s inventory and remaining time as we will see later,
then the bargaining problem reduces to a sequential game between the buyer and the
seller. In such a game, a subgame perfect equilibrium would be the bargainer making
the minimum possible offer that will be acceptable to the seller. In fact, any sub-
game perfect equilibrium for such a sequential game will result in a final settlement
price equal to the seller’s marginal value of one unit of inventory. In most practical
cases, however, the bargainer is not likely to know all the information pertinent to
the seller’s marginal value of one unit of inventory, such as the seller’s inventory,
the arrival rate of customers, the seller’s belief on the customers’ reservation prices,
etc. In the absence of such information, the best signal that bargainers have about
the seller’s valuation of the product is the posted price; at the very least, bargainers
know that the seller is willing to sell the product at the posted price, p. Thus, we
assume that the bargainer believes that her probability of acquiring the product is
a function of the posted price p and the offer po, and is given by cdf G(po|p) with a
corresponding pdf g(po|p).
Ideally, the bargainer would make an offer po to maximize the expected surplus
she will obtain as a result of the counter-offer from the seller. However, the bargainer
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cannot perfectly predict how the seller will choose its counter-offer, since the counter-
offer is a function of the seller’s private information such as inventory level, arrival
rate of customers, etc. Therefore, we assume that the bargainer maximizes her
maximum expected surplus, which is the surplus the bargainer draws if the seller
is willing to sell the product at the bargainer’s offer. In other words, the objective
function of a bargainer with reservation price r is
S(po, r) = (r − po)G(po|p). (2.1)




The trade-off that the bargainer faces is as follows: The larger the offer, the larger
the bargainer’s probability of acquiring the product, but the smaller the maximum
surplus she can obtain from the acquisition. The problem is further complicated
by the lower bound of p − θ on the offer. To provide regularity to the bargainer’s
objective function, we will need the following assumption:
Assumption 1. G(·|p) is strictly increasing and log-concave over the domain [0, p].1
In addition, G(x|p) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and G(x|p) = 1 for x ≥ p.
The following lemma states that S(po, r) is a well-behaved function of the offer,
po. The proofs of this and all other results are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 2.3.1. The objective function of a bargainer with reservation price r, S(po, r),
has the following properties:
(a) S(po, r) is unimodal in the customer’s offer, po, for po ∈ [0, p].
(b) S(po, r) = 0 for po ≤ 0 and S(po, r) is strictly decreasing in po for po ≥ p.
1In fact, the lower bound of the domain, 0, can be replaced by some a > 0 as long as a ≤
arg max pF̄ (p), the myopic optimal price.
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Given a posted price p, let p∗o(p, r) denote the optimal offer of a bargainer with
reservation price r, i.e., p∗o(p, r) is the solution to the optimization problem given by
(2.2). For a given posted price p, denote the unconstrained optimizer of the function
S(po, r) by
po(r) := sup{x : S(x, r) ≥ S(po, r),∀po}
Define function ρ(·) implicitly as
ρ(x) = min{r ∈ [0, b] : S(x, r) ≥ S(po, r),∀po}, (2.3)
i.e., ρ(x) is the reservation price of the bargainer for whom po = x is an optimizer of
S(po, r), the bargainer’s unconstrained objective function. (We use min operator in
case there exist a group of bargainers with different reservation prices for all of whom
x is an optimizer.) Note that, with this definition, ρ(x) = 0 for any x ≤ 0 (since
G(x|p) = 0 for all x ≤ 0, any bargainer with r > 0 could do better by making a
strictly positive offer). With the help of the definitions made so far, we characterize
the optimal offer of a bargainer in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.2. Given a posted price p, the optimal offer of a bargainer with reser-
vation price r is
p∗o(p, r) =

(p− θ)+ if p− θ ≤ r ≤ ρ(p− θ);
po(r) ∈ (p− θ, p) if ρ(p− θ) < r ≤ ρ(p);
po(r) = p if r > ρ(p).
(2.4)
In essence, customers with low reservation prices will ask for the largest discount,
θ, and customers with higher reservation prices will make offers that depend on their
reservation prices, those with the highest reservation prices offering to pay the posted
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price p. One may wonder if a bargainer will ever offer to pay the posted price, p,
in practice. Under Assumption 1, such a possibility exists if the arbitrarily chosen
posted price is small but the reservation price of the bargainer is very high. To avoid
this possibility, one could impose a reasonable technical assumption on g(·|p) such
as g(p|p) = 0, which guarantees that all bargainers will make an offer strictly below
p. Furthermore, in Section 2.4, we work with a uniformly distributed G(·|p), and we
find that a bargainer never offers to pay the posted price when the posted price is
chosen optimally.
2.3.2 The Firm’s Revenue Maximization Problem
At the beginning of period t, t = 1, . . . , T , the firm, given y units in inventory,
sets the posted price, p. Since only price-takers with reservation prices greater than
or equal to the posted price p will purchase the product, it follows that the expected
revenue accrued from the price-taker in the current period is simply pF (p). On the
other hand, the revenue accrued from the bargainer and the chance that the bargainer
buys the product in the current period are determined by the outcome of negotiation.
Let Kt(p, y) denote the firm’s expected revenue in period t, given that a bargainer
has arrived and the firm has y units in inventory. In addition, let Bt(p, y) denote
the probability that a bargainer will buy the product at the end of the negotiation.






λq [Kt(p, y) + Bt(p, y)Vt−1(y − 1)]
+λ(1− q)
[








for y > 0, t = 1, . . . , T (2.5)
V0(y) = 0 for y ≥ 0, and Vt(0) = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T






= Vt−1(y) + λq [Kt(p, y)−Bt(p, y)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))]
+λ(1− q)F (p) [p− (Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))] (2.6)
Let p∗t (y) denote the optimal solution to the maximization problem in (2.6), i.e.,
p∗t (y) is the optimal posted price in period t with y units of inventory. Notice that
Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1) represents the benefit from keeping an extra unit of inventory
for period t − 1 (i.e., the marginal value of inventory). Throughout the chapter,
we let ∆t−1(y) = Vt−1(y) − Vt−1(y − 1) and we refer to it as the marginal value of
inventory. To determine p∗t (y) and the resultant outcome of negotiation, it suffices
to consider the case p ≥ ∆t−1(y) as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.3. The optimal posted price of the seller with y units of inventory and
t periods to go must be greater than or equal to ∆t−1(y).
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2.3.3 Seller’s Counter-offer Problem
After seeing the customer’s offer, the seller makes a counter-offer. Suppose in
period t, with y units in inventory, a customer arrives and offers to pay po. By virtue
of Lemma 2.3.2, there are two cases to consider: po = p− θ or po > p− θ.
Case 1. po = p−θ: In this case, the seller knows that the customer’s reservation
price is between p−θ and ρ(p−θ) and updates its belief on the bargainer’s reservation
price accordingly. Note that any counter-offer greater than ρ(p− θ) will be rejected
by the bargainer. If the bargainer buys, the seller’s revenue-to-go from next period
onward is Vt−1(y−1). On the other hand, if the negotiation breaks down, the seller’s
revenue-to-go is simply Vt−1(y). Therefore, the expected profit of the seller charging
counter-offer price pc in period t with y units of inventory when facing the bargainer’s










Vt−1(y) if p− θ ≤ pc ≤ ρ(p− θ);
0 if pc > ρ(p− θ).
(2.7)
Obviously, the seller will never choose a counter-offer below the bargainer’s offer
po = p− θ, i.e., pc ≥ p− θ. Likewise, the seller is not allowed to make a counter-offer
that exceeds the posted price since such a business practice would be unacceptable.




We make the following assumption to guarantee that the function Zt(pc, y) is well-
behaved.
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Assumption 2. The cdf of Rc, F (·), is a strictly increasing function with an in-
creasing failure rate.
Under Assumption 2, the following result holds:
Lemma 2.3.4. The seller’s objective function, Zt(pc, y), is unimodal in the counter-
offer, pc, for pc ∈ [p− θ, ρ(p− θ)].
Let pct(y) be the solution to the optimization problem in (2.8), i.e.,
pct(y) = arg max
{pc|p−θ≤pc≤min[p,ρ(p−θ)]}
Zt(pc, y).
Hence, if a customer offers po = p − θ, the seller will set its counter-offer to pct(y),
provided that selling to the bargainer at that price is better than keeping an ex-
tra unit of inventory for the next period, i.e., if pct(y) > ∆t−1(y). Otherwise, if
pct(y) ≤ ∆t−1(y), then the seller would set its counter-offer equal to the marginal
value of inventory, ∆t−1(y). Thus, the seller’s counter-offer is max[pct(y), ∆t−1(y)].
Case 2. po > p − θ: In this case, it must be that po = po(r) by Lemma 2.3.2.
Therefore, the seller deduces that the bargainer’s reservation price is at least ρ(po),
and will set its counter-offer equal to min{ρ(po), p}, provided that selling to the
bargainer is better than keeping an extra unit of inventory, i.e., min{ρ(po), p} >
∆t−1(y). Thus, the seller’s counter-offer is equal to max{min{ρ(po), p}, ∆t−1(y)}.
The following lemma summarizes the optimal solution to the firm’s counter-offer
problem.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let p∗ct(p, po, y) denote the optimal counter-offer that the firm will
make in period t with y units in inventory, provided that a customer offers to pay po
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and the posted price is p. Then:
p∗ct(p, po, y) =

max{pct(y), ∆t−1(y)} if po = p− θ;
max{min{ρ(po), p}, ∆t−1(y)} if po > p− θ.
(2.9)
2.3.4 The Outcome of the Negotiation
Using the results established in previous subsections, we are able to characterize
the behavior of a bargainer with reservation price r arriving in period t, i.e., whether
the bargainer will buy and, if so, at what price, given that the seller has y units
of inventory and its posted price is p. It suffices to consider only the cases where
p ≥ ∆t−1(y) (by Lemma 2.3.3). When a bargainer arrives, the interactions of a
bargainer and the seller follow one of four cases, shown in Figure 2.1. (The results
summarized in Figure 2.1 are proven in Lemma 2.3.6.)
In all four cases, a bargainer whose reservation price is below p− θ quits without
making an offer. All other bargainers make an offer; an individual bargainer’s offer
depends on her reservation price, r. In the first of four cases, after receiving an
offer from the bargainer, the seller is unwilling to negotiate further and sets the
counter-offer equal to the posted price. Thus, only bargainers with r ≥ p purchase
and they do so at the posted price, p. In the second case, in response to an offer
from the bargainer, the seller chooses one of two counter-offers, pct(y) or p. As a
result, bargainers with high reservation prices end up buying at the posted price p,
whereas bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, ρ(p − θ)] are split into two; some drop out of
the negotiation and others purchase at pct(y). In the third case, again in response
to the bargainer’s offer, the seller may choose one of three counter-offers, pct(y),
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Figure 2.1: Four possible cases of negotiation outcome, shown as a function of the
buyer’s reservation price, r.
sufficiently high reservation prices end up buying at the posted price p. This time,
only bargainers with r ∈ [pct(y), ρ(p − θ)] purchase at pct(y) whereas bargainers
with r ∈ (ρ(p − θ), p] pay their reservation price, r. As before, bargainers with r ∈
[p−θ, pct(y)) drop out of negotiation. In the fourth case, the seller’s counter-offer will
be the posted price p or the marginal value of inventory ∆t−1(y), or the bargainer’s
reservation price. Once again, customers with sufficiently large reservation prices
end up paying the posted price, p. Others either pay their reservation price or drop
out of the negotiation.
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Figure 2.2: Different bargaining outcomes arise depending on posted price p and
reservation price r. For this example, we use F ∼ Exp(0.02), G(x|p) =
1−e−0.025x
1−e−0.025p , λ = 0.7, q = 0.8, t = 2, y = 1, and θ = 20.
as a function of the posted price p and the bargainer’s reservation price r. As the
example shows, our negotiation model captures many different kinds of outcomes
that we would expect to see in practice.
Once we characterize the outcome of the negotiation as a function of p, r, t, and
y, we can derive the seller’s expected revenue from a bargainer, Kt(p, y), and the
probability that a bargainer will buy the product, Bt(p, y), both of which are used
in the optimality equation (2.5).
Lemma 2.3.6. Suppose a bargainer arrives in period t when the seller with y units
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of inventory charges the posted price p.
(a) If ∆t−1(y) ≤ p ≤ pct(y) ≤ ρ(p− θ), then
Kt(p, y) = pF (p)
Bt(p, y) = F (p)
(b) If ∆t−1(y) ≤ pct(y) < p ≤ ρ(p− θ), then
Kt(p, y) = pct(y) (F (ρ(p− θ))− F (pct(y))) + pF (ρ(p− θ))
Bt(p, y) = F (pct(y))
(c) If ∆t−1(y) ≤ pct(y) ≤ ρ(p− θ) < p, then
Kt(p, y) = pct(y) (F (ρ(p− θ))− F (pct(y))) +
∫ p
ρ(p−θ)
xf(x)dx + pF (p)
Bt(p, y) = F (pct(y))




xf(x)dx + pF (p)
Bt(p, y) = F (∆t−1(y))
Lemma 2.3.6 enables us to embed the results of negotiation, Kt(p, y) and Bt(p, y),
into the optimality equation and solve for the seller’s optimal posted price at each
period and inventory level. It is easy to construct numerical examples to demonstrate
that the optimal posted price can lie in any one of the four cases of Lemma 2.3.6,
depending on the marginal value of inventory and parameter values. Hence, none of
the four cases can be ruled out as a potential optimal solution to the posted price
problem. Since the revenue-to-go function Vt(y) follows one of four cases depending
on which case the optimal posted price lies in, it is difficult to prove additional struc-
tural results about the dynamic program to gain further managerial insights into the
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problem. To this end, we impose additional assumptions on the customers’ reser-
vation price distribution and the seller’s valuation distribution in the next section.
Our numerical study in Section 2.5 demonstrates that the results of the next section
hold under less-restrictive assumptions on the distributions as well.
2.4 Analysis
In this section we explore the seller’s optimal pricing strategy as a function of
inventory and remaining time and examine the effect of negotiation on the seller and
customers (both price-takers and bargainers). We impose the following additional
assumption to simplify the problem.
Assumption 3. We assume that F (·) is uniform between (0, b) and G(·|p) is uniform
between (0, p).
One could pick non-zero lower bounds for the distributions F and G; such
generalization only changes algebra without changing insights. In particular, if
F (·) ∼ U(a, b) and G(·|p) ∼ U(a, p), then the lower-bound a imposes additional
constraints on the seller’s posted price and counter-offer. The remainder of the anal-
ysis follows the same reasoning. Likewise, if F (·) ∼ U(a, b) and G(·|p) ∼ U(c, p)
with a < c, then one could simply ignore the bargainers whose reservation prices are
between a and c (since those bargainers will not even make an offer), and the same
insights will hold. On the other hand, the case with a > c could be dealt with, but it
is not a reasonable assumption in that it implies there are bargainers who believe the
seller’s valuation is less than the smallest reservation price among all customers. Fur-
thermore, our numerical study, to be discussed in the next section, provides evidence
that the insights remain the same when F and G follow non-uniform distributions.
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Even with Assumption 3, the revenue-to-go function is still complex as discussed
in the previous section (i.e., all four cases may arise). However, under this assump-
tion, we find a closed form expression for the optimal posted price (and the resulting
bargainer’s offer and seller’s counter-offer), which renders the problem analytically
tractable.
The following lemma states the optimal posted price of the seller, p∗t (y). As the
lemma shows, the optimal posted price depends critically on how the largest discount
a customer will demand, θ, compares to the marginal value of inventory, ∆t−1(y), in
addition to the fraction of bargainers, q, and the range of reservation prices, [0, b].
Lemma 2.4.1. Suppose the seller has y units of inventory with t periods to go until
the end of the season. Then:
(a) If θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4






< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)






(c) If θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)





Given the optimal posted price stated in Lemma 2.4.1, the bargainer’s optimal
offer will be as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose the seller has y units of inventory with t periods to go until
the end of the season. Given the optimal posted price p∗t (y), all bargainers who do not
quit will make an offer p∗o(p
∗
t (y), r) strictly less than the posted price. In particular:
(a) If p∗t (y)− θ ≤ r ≤ 2(p∗t (y)− θ), then the optimal offer is p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y)− θ.




Note from Lemma 2.4.2 that the bargainer’s offer will be either the smallest
possible offer she can make, p∗t (y)− θ or half of her reservation price, r/2. One can
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t (y), r), y) in the following lemma. For brevity, we will












t (y), r), y).
Lemma 2.4.3. Suppose the seller has y units of inventory with t periods to go until
the end of the season. Then:






o, y) = p
∗
t (y) regardless of the bargainer’s offer.
(b) If ∆t−1(y)
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 p∗t (y)− θ + ∆t−1(y)2 if p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y)− θ;p∗t (y) if p∗o(p∗t (y), r) > p∗t (y)− θ.
(c) If b+∆t−1(y)
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t (y), r) > p
∗
t (y)− θ and p∗o(p∗t (y), r) <
p∗t (y)
2 ;




t (y), r) > p
∗
t (y)− θ and p∗o(p∗t (y), r) ≥
p∗t (y)
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∆t−1(y) if p∗t (y)− θ ≤ p∗o(p∗t (y), r) <
∆t−1(y)
2 ;




t (y), r) <
p∗t (y)
2 ;




t (y), r) ≥
p∗t (y)
2 .
The closed-form expressions stated in Lemmas 2.4.1 through 2.4.3 help us obtain
a number of results regarding the effect of negotiation on the optimal posted price,
the seller’s expected revenue and the customer’s surplus. Before we discuss these
results, we first define the following auxiliary optimization problem of a seller with
y units of inventory and t periods to go. This optimization problem represents the
pricing problem faced by a seller using take-it-or-leave-it pricing in the current period
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(i.e., forcing all customers to act as price-takers), and allowing negotiation from next






λF (p)p + λF (p)Vt−1(y − 1) + (1− λF (p))Vt−1(y)
}
, y > 0, t = 1, . . . , T
(2.10)
Let pTLt (y) denote the optimal solution to the optimization problem given by (2.10).




The following proposition compares the optimal posted price, p∗t (y), with the take-
it-or-leave-it price, pTLt (y).
Proposition 2.4.1. Suppose the seller has y units of inventory with t periods to go
until the end of the season. Then the seller’s optimal posted price, p∗t (y), is between
pTLt (y) and p
TL
t (y) + θ.
The proposition highlights the effect of negotiation on the posted price. If nego-
tiation were not allowed in period t, the seller would charge the price pTLt (y). Under
negotiation, however, the seller adds a premium on top of pTLt (y) with the intention
of selling at a lower price to some customers. In other words, the premium allows the
seller to price discriminate based on customers’ willingness to pay. It is interesting to
note that the premium is less than the largest discount a bargainer would demand,
θ.
We now focus on how negotiation affects the seller’s revenue. As stated in Propo-
sition 2.4.1, the seller raises the posted price to price-discriminate among bargainers.
The increased posted price results in loss of revenue from price-takers. Furthermore,
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under negotiation, some bargainers may be able to negotiate down to a price be-
low the take-it-or-leave-it price. Even so, one would expect that negotiation would
improve the seller’s expected revenue, given that the seller can always walk out of
negotiation by repeating the posted price as its counter-offer. Indeed, the following
proposition states that negotiation improves the seller’s expected revenue.
Proposition 2.4.2. Suppose the seller has y units in inventory and t periods to
go and will use negotiation from period t − 1 onward. The seller is better off by
negotiating with posted price p∗t (y) in period t than using take-it-or-leave-it pricing
with posted price pTLt (y) in period t.
It is not difficult to extend the result of Proposition 2.4.2 to the case where one
seller uses negotiation throughout the selling season and the other uses take-it-or-
leave-it pricing.
Corollary 2.4.1. Suppose the seller has y units in inventory and t periods to go.
The revenue of the seller across the t-period horizon is larger under negotiation than
under take-it-or-leave-it pricing.
In some cases, the posted price decision might be dictated by an outside party
(e.g., manufacturer). We note that Corollary 2.4.1 extends to the case where the
posted price p is determined exogenously, that is, the revenue of the seller across
the selling horizon is larger when the seller is negotiating with the exogenous posted
price p than using take-it-or-leave-it pricing at the same price. The result is not too
surprising since the negotiating seller will settle for a price below p only if it improves
the expected revenue-to-go (otherwise, the seller sticks to p as its counter-offer.)
We next turn our attention to the effect of negotiation on the customers. Since
the seller is charging a premium under negotiation, it is clear that certain price-
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takers who were able to afford the product under take-it-or-leave-it pricing will not
be able to afford it under negotiation. However, it is not clear how the bargainers
are affected. The following proposition characterizes which bargainers are better off
due to negotiation.
Proposition 2.4.3. No price-taker is better off under negotiation compared to take-
it-or-leave-it pricing. As for a bargainer who purchases:
(a) If θ ≤ ∆t−1(y)
2
, the bargainer ends up buying at pTLt (y), thus she is neither worse
nor better off under negotiation.
(b) If ∆t−1(y)
2
< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , there exists a threshold reservation price such that
the bargainer is better off if her reservation price is below the threshold and worse off
otherwise.
(c) If θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , then the bargainer is worse off under negotiation.
Proposition 2.4.3(a) states that, if θ is too small, the seller reverts to take-it-or-
leave-it pricing by setting both the posted price and counter-offer to pTLt (y). In this
case, the negotiation has no effect on the consumers. When θ is moderately large
(as in Proposition 2.4.3(b)), some bargainers will be better off under negotiation
compared to take-it-or-leave-it pricing while others are worse off. In this case, the
seller takes advantage of price-takers or bargainers with high reservation prices, but
yields to the bargainers with low reservation prices. The proof of the proposition
reveals what is common across the bargainers who benefit from negotiation: Their
reservation prices are large enough that they end up buying, but small enough that
they successfully negotiate for the largest possible discount, θ. On the other hand, if
θ is very large (as in proposition 2.4.3(c)), the seller charges a large premium on top
of pTLt (y) and sells only to customers with high reservation price. In this case, the
seller does not sell to the bargainers who demand the largest possible discount, θ. For
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the bargainer who purchases, her final purchase price is either her own reservation
price or the posted price itself. Thus, no customer is better off.
We now investigate how the optimal posted price, p∗t (y), depends on the largest
discount a customer would demand, θ, and the proportion of the bargainers in the
customer population, q. To investigate the effect of θ and q, we check the comparative
statics when θ or q changes in the current period only, while θ and q values for all
other periods remain the same. The following proposition states our result:
Proposition 2.4.4. The optimal posted price p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in the largest
discount a customer would demand, θ, and in the proportion of the bargainers in the
customer population, q, in the current period.
From Lemma 2.4.1, we observe that when θ is very small (which is the case






Once θ is sufficiently high, the seller starts to charge a premium on top of pTLt (y).
Proposition 2.4.4 shows that the size of the premium depends not only on θ but
also on the fraction of bargainers, q. If (i) θ is very small or (ii) θ is larger but the
fraction of bargainers is small, then the seller needs to take into account the large
revenue stream from price-takers and charges little or no premium in order not to
turn away too many price-takers. As the fraction of bargainers increases, the seller
puts less emphasis on the price-takers and starts to increase the premium to better
price-discriminate among bargainers.
Of course, one would wonder what happens to the posted price when θ and q
change across the entire planning horizon. As noted earlier, the seller’s revenue in
a period is the price collected from a purchaser, which is determined through the
posted price, the corresponding buyer’s offer, and the resulting seller’s counter-offer,
all of which are complicated functions of θ and q. Consequently, it is not easy to
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extend Proposition 2.4.4 to the case where q or θ change across the entire horizon.
We investigate this question through a numerical study in the next section.
At the heart of benefits from negotiation is the seller’s ability to price-discriminate
through a premium. As Proposition 2.4.4 indicates, the larger θ in the current period,
the higher the price in the current period and, therefore, the larger the premium due
to negotiation. This larger premium enables the seller to do a finer price discrimina-
tion. Therefore, one would expect the seller’s revenue to increase in θ. Likewise, the
more likely it is that the seller will encounter a bargainer in the current period, the
higher the chances that the seller will be able to price-discriminate through negotia-
tion. Thus, we expect that the seller’s revenue increases in the fraction of bargainers,
q. To investigate the effect of θ and q on the seller’s expected revenue, we check the
comparative statics when θ or q changes in the current period only. The following
proposition states our result:
Proposition 2.4.5. The optimal expected total revenue of the seller increases if the
largest discount that a bargainer may demand, θ or the fraction of the bargainers, q
increases in the current period.
Our numerical results in the next section verify this result when q or θ changes
across the entire horizon. Finally, we investigate how the optimal posted price is
influenced by the stock level and time-to-go until the end of the horizon.
Proposition 2.4.6. The optimal posted price p∗t (y) is non-increasing in the stock
level, y, and non-decreasing in the number of remaining periods, t.
Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and Bitran and Mondschein (1997) show that the
same behavior occurs in the case of take-it-or-leave-it pricing. In our model, where
the seller charges a premium on top of the take-it-or-leave-it price, the same key
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drivers (e.g., the risk of stock-out, the risk of having excess inventory) influence the
optimal posted price, which leads to the same behavior.
2.5 Numerical Study
We conduct a numerical study to gain further managerial insights into the use
of negotiation along with dynamic pricing. We identify the scenarios under which
negotiation benefits the seller the most, and we investigate if and when dynamic
pricing and negotiation reinforce each other. In addition, we explore the effect of
negotiation on the posted price and we analyze how the gap between the posted price
and the take-it-or-leave-it price depends on the inventory level and other problem
parameters.
In our numerical study we consider several different combinations of parameter
values. We use three different values for each of: probability that a customer arrives
in a given period (λ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.7}), the largest discount that a bargainer would
demand (θ ∈ {5, 20, 70}), and the proportion of bargainers (q ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}). We
also consider three different pairs of F (·) and G(·|p) distributions:
i) F (·) ∼ uniform over [0, 200] and G(·|p) ∼ uniform over [0, p]
ii) F (·) ∼ exponential with mean 50 and G(·|p) = P (X|X ≤ p) where X ∼ expo-
nential with mean 40
iii) F (·) ∼ Weibull with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter 50 and G(·|p) =
P (X|X ≤ p) where X is Weibull with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter 40.
For numerical convenience, we use F (·) and G(·|p) that come from the same
family of distributions; our general model and results presented in Section 3.3 do
not require such an assumption. Note that this parameter set results in 81 different
combinations of λ, θ, q and F (·), G(·|P ) distributions.
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We first compare two sellers, one using negotiation and the other using take-it-
or-leave-it pricing throughout the selling season. This comparison allows us to gain
insights into the benefits of negotiation. We consider a 15-period selling season and
we vary the starting inventory level from 1 to 15. For each starting inventory level
and under all 81 combinations of λ, θ, q, and F (·), G(·|P ) distributions described
above, we solve the dynamic program associated with each seller and determine
the seller’s optimal expected revenue, resulting in 1,215 different problem instances.
For each problem instance, we measure the percentage revenue improvement from
negotiation and summarize the results in Table 2.1.
F, G Uniform F, G Exponential F, G Weibull
θ q Mean (Std) Max Min Mean (Std) Max Min Mean (Std) Max Min
5 0.2 0.03 (0.02) 0.05 0.00 0.25 (0.1) 0.31 0.01 0.93 (0.43) 1.24 0.04
5 0.5 0.08 (0.05) 0.13 0.00 0.63 (0.25) 0.79 0.04 2.31 (1.09) 3.11 0.11
5 0.8 0.13 (0.08) 0.20 0.00 1.02 (0.4) 1.27 0.06 3.7 (1.75) 4.99 0.18
20 0.2 0.58 (0.3) 0.80 0.02 2.23 (0.88) 2.77 0.14 4.52 (1.36) 5.34 0.56
20 0.5 1.44 (0.75) 2.00 0.04 5.53 (2.22) 6.93 0.35 13.28 (4.57) 16.11 1.35
20 0.8 2.3 (1.21) 3.20 0.07 8.78 (3.58) 11.09 0.56 23.39 (9.02) 29.68 2.10
70 0.2 6.93 (2.27) 8.35 0.72 15.12 (2.99) 16.67 4.25 8.41 (1.51) 9.37 4.06
70 0.5 17.35 (6.04) 21.30 1.65 43.3 (10.82) 49.67 9.49 26.25 (5.53) 29.95 11.41
70 0.8 27.64 (10.18) 34.63 2.43 71.19 (20.3) 84.37 13.47 56.03 (14.67) 66.86 20.59
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Percentage Revenue Improvement from Negotia-
tion
We observe from Table 2.1 that the larger the largest discount asked by the cus-
tomers, θ, the larger the revenue improvement due to negotiation. Likewise, the
larger the proportion of bargainers, q, the larger the revenue improvement due to
negotiation. Furthermore, we observe that the seller’s benefit from negotiation tends
to be larger under exponential and Weibull distributions for F and G, compared to
uniform. Weibull and exponential reservation prices have heavier tails compared to
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uniform, indicating a larger portion of customers with high reservation prices. The
seller can extract more revenue out of those customers through negotiation, which
results in the benefits from negotiation being higher under Weibull and exponential
distributions. We observe in our numerical study that the percentage revenue im-
provement is larger when starting inventory level is higher. We will further explore
the effect of starting inventory later in this section.
Table 2.2 summarizes the magnitude of percentage improvement for all 1,215
problem instances tested. In more than 70% of instances, the percentage revenue
improvement is greater than 1%. In about 33% of instances, the revenue improve-
ment is greater than 10%. These numbers suggest that, even when there is cost for
implementing negotiation, the seller can realize significant benefit from negotiation.
% Improvement < 1% 1− 3% 3− 5% 5− 10% 10− 20% 20− 30% > 30% Total
Number of cases 355 183 109 166 139 114 149 1215
Table 2.2: Frequency Table for Percentage Revenue Improvement
The effect of inventory level on the benefit of negotiation: Figure 2.3 illus-
trates the effect of inventory level on the negotiation outcome. As illustrated in the
figure, the seller is able to do a finer price discrimination when inventory level is high.
When the inventory level is low relative to the remaining selling horizon, the seller
is not worried about leftover inventory, hence the optimal posted price is likely to be
very high. In this case, a substantial portion of bargainers will quit (some will quit
without even making an offer and others cannot afford the seller’s counter-offer, thus
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Figure 2.3: Negotiation outcomes with respect to the starting inventory level when
λ = 0.7, θ = 70, q = 0.8, F (·) ∼ U [0, 200] and G(·|p) ∼ U [0, p].
hand, when the inventory level is high, the negotiating seller can still charge a high
posted price, but is willing to settle for less. Thus, fewer bargainers will quit and
those who buy the product will pay a wide range of prices. For example, in Figure
2.3, when y = 10, some buy at the posted price (43.3% of bargainers), others buy
at the reservation price (13.3%), and still others make the lowest possible offer and
buy at the corresponding counter-offer (20.3%). In other words, when the inventory
level is high, the seller is able to do a finer price discrimination, while at the same
time increasing the chance of making a sale. Therefore, one would expect that the
benefits from negotiation (i.e., the additional revenue a seller can realize by combin-
ing dynamic pricing with negotiation instead of using dynamic pricing only) will be
higher when inventory level is high. In fact, Figure 2.4 shows that the percentage
revenue improvement from negotiation increases in the inventory level. Furthermore,























Figure 2.4: Percentage revenue improvement with respect to the starting inventory
level when λ = 0.7, θ = 70, F (·) ∼ U [0, 200] and G(·|p) ∼ U [0, p].
The effect of inventory level on the price premium: In Section 2.4, under
Assumption 3, we proved that the posted price of a negotiating seller with y units of
inventory in period t, p∗t (y) includes a premium on top of the price the same seller
would choose if it did not use negotiation in period t, pTLt (y). We now compare the
posted price of the negotiating seller (p∗t (y)) to the price that the seller would choose
if the seller were using dynamically adjusted take-it-or-leave-it prices throughout the
horizon. Figure 2.5 illustrates how the inventory level affects the price premium for
the negotiating seller.
When inventory level is very low (compared to remaining selling horizon), the
seller has many opportunities to sell. Thus, dynamic pricing dictates a high posted
price regardless of whether negotiation is used or not, which overshadows the price
premium that the negotiating seller would charge. On the other hand, if inventory



























Figure 2.5: Percentage price premium under negotiation when λ = 0.7, θ = 5, and
F (·) exponential with mean 50, G(·|p) = P (X|X ≤ p) where X is expo-
nential with mean 40.
at the end of the selling season. In other words, the marginal value of inventory
approaches zero and the premium caused by negotiation more or less stabilizes.
At moderate inventory levels, the price premium caused by negotiation is at its
largest. At such inventory levels, the seller is neither pressured to move inventory
quickly nor tempted to sell only to customers with very high reservation prices.
Therefore, in the absence of negotiation, the seller would charge a moderate price.
However, with negotiation, the seller can use a high price premium and start with a
high posted price, with the intention to settle for lower prices that a bargainer may
accept during negotiation.
Dynamic pricing or negotiation: Which one is better? Note that both ne-
gotiation and dynamic pricing are tools that a seller can use to improve its revenue.
We next compare the benefits from each of these two strategies from the perspec-
tive of the seller who is using neither dynamic pricing nor negotiation in status quo.
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Consider a seller who picks the the optimal static take-it-or-leave it price at the
beginning of the selling season (i.e., the seller uses the same price throughout the
selling season). Figure 2.6 illustrates, as a function of the seller’s initial inventory,
the revenue improvement the seller would realize by switching to dynamic pricing
(without negotiation) or negotiation (without dynamic pricing). When inventory
level is low, the seller would like to start with a very high price with the intention
of reducing the price later in the season if the product is not selling well. Thus, the
benefit from dynamic pricing exceeds the benefit from negotiation at low inventory
levels. On the other hand, when inventory level is high, the seller’s primary concern
is to move inventory before the end of the season, in which case negotiation proves
to be an effective tool, since the seller can still price discriminate without reduc-
ing the chances of making a sale. Hence, at high inventory levels, the benefit from
negotiation exceeds the benefit from dynamic pricing.
Interaction between dynamic pricing and negotiation: We now examine
how the benefit of negotiation depends on the seller’s pricing strategy (dynamic
vs. static.) To this end, consider two take-it-or-leave-it-pricing sellers: one using
static pricing throughout the season and the other seller using dynamic pricing. We
compare the revenue improvement (in percentage) from negotiation for these two sell-
ers. This will enable us to identify whether or not dynamic pricing and negotiation
reinforce each other.
We observe from Figure 2.7 that, when initial inventory is low, the static-pricing
seller will realize larger benefits from negotiation than the dynamic-pricing seller. At
low inventory levels, the seller caters only to customers with high reservation prices.
Thus, both negotiation and dynamic pricing are used to raise the the price at which
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Figure 2.6: Consider the seller who currently uses static pricing with no negotiation.
The figure shows the percentage revenue improvement when switching to
dynamic pricing only and switching to negotiation only. Here, λ = 0.7,
θ = 20, q = 0.8, and F (·) exponential with mean 50, G(·|p) = P (X|X ≤
p) where X is exponential with mean 40.
benefit from negotiation is small. In other words, dynamic pricing and negotiation
act as substitutes at low inventory levels.
Interestingly, however, this is reversed at moderate inventory levels, that is, the
benefit of adding negotiation is larger for the dynamic-pricing seller than the static-
pricing seller. As we discussed before, at moderate inventory levels, the negotiating
seller charges a high posted price under dynamic pricing with the intention to settle
for lower prices during negotiation. The dynamic-pricing seller can do this, because
if the product is not sold in the current period, the seller can always reduce the price
in the next period. Under static pricing, however, if the seller started with a high
posted price to take advantage of negotiation, then the seller would be stuck with
that high price throughout the horizon, which curbs the seller’s ability to exploit

























Figure 2.7: Consider the two take-it-or-leave-it pricing sellers, one using static pric-
ing and one using dynamic pricing strategies. The figure illustrates the
percentage revenue improvement that each seller can realize by adding
negotiation. Here, λ = 0.7, θ = 20, q = 0.8, and F (·) exponential with
mean 50, G(·|p) = P (X|X ≤ p) where X is exponential with mean 40.
negotiation is not as beneficial under static pricing as it is under dynamic pricing.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we investigate the effect of negotiation on the dynamic pricing
of a seller with limited inventory. We have presented a negotiation model for the
seller with limited inventory, and embedded the outcome of the negotiation into the
corresponding dynamic pricing problem. Our negotiation model allows us to capture
interactions among key drivers of the seller and the buyer’s decisions: the seller’s
marginal value of inventory and the buyer’s reservation price and type. We have
demonstrated that our proposed model captures a spectrum of outcomes that may
arise in practice while maintaining analytical tractability to draw insightful results.
Our results suggest that negotiation is an effective tool that eases the tension between
revenue per sale and the risk of excess inventory at the end of the selling season, which
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is a key trade-off in dynamic pricing.
We show that a negotiating seller increases the posted price. The high posted
price increases the revenue per sale without compromising the chance of making a
sale as some customers can purchase at discounted prices. This is particularly helpful
when the inventory level is moderate or high relative to the remaining selling season.
In such cases, as negotiation mitigates the risk of excess inventory, the seller can
raise the posted price substantially higher than the seller who does not negotiate,
and the benefit of using negotiation increases in the inventory level. On the other
hand, when inventory level is low, the risk of excess inventory is already low, thus
the seller is primarily interested in selling at high prices. As a result, the additional
benefit from negotiation is not as significant.
CHAPTER 3
The Effect of Negotiation on the Supply Chain
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, retailers actively decide whether to use negotiation or
posted pricing when selling to the end customers, and different retailers use different
sales formats to sell the same product. Negotiation enables the retailer to extract
larger revenue from the customers who are willing to pay more, but this enhanced
ability to price discriminate often comes at a cost: The negotiation takes time and
effort on the parts of the retailer and customers. For example, eliminating negotia-
tion and selling at a fixed, posted price tends to reduce the need for additional sales
managers at a dealership, which could result in significant savings given that sales
managers make about $150,000 per year. In addition, it is reported that dealers who
adopt haggle-free pricing experience a reduction of about $300 in per-car advertise-
ment costs. Posted pricing could bring similar benefits for customers. Customers of
Scion, the only division of Toyota that does not allow dealers to bargain, spend 45
minutes to close a deal, as opposed to the national average of four and a half hours
(Welch, 2007). When choosing the sales format, the retailer has to weigh the cost
of negotiation against the benefit from price discrimination enabled by negotiation.
Of course, the retailer’s sales format choice affects the profit of the manufacturer
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who provides the goods sold by the retailer. The manufacturer can influence the re-
tailer’s decision, for example, through a simple contract like the wholesale-price-only
contract. This chapter aims to highlight what sales format and price choices may
arise in equilibrium, given that the manufacturer’s power to set the wholesale price
is pitched against the retailer’s power to determine the sales format.
When analyzing the equilibrium sales format, we place particular emphasis on
the effect of capacity available in the supply chain. The availability of a product
tends to have significant effect on the discounts that retailers concede to bargainers.
For example, according to Edmunds.com, customers who purchase Camry XLE in
southeast Michigan are able to negotiate, on average, a discount of 6% from MSRP,
while the Prius, which is in short supply, is sold at an average discount of only
1.3%. Since the availability of a product has a significant effect on the transaction
prices, one expects it to have some influence over the equilibrium sales format. In
this chapter, we model availability in the form of a capacity constraint on the supply
chain, and we analyze the effect of supply chain capacity on the equilibrium.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
survey of the relevant literature. Section 3.3 outlines our model. In Section 3.4, we
analyze the problem without capacity constraints, which sets the stage for Section
3.5 where we analyze the supply chain with capacity constraints. We conclude in
Section 3.6 with a summary. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Literature Review
Bargaining has been studied extensively in economics and there is a wealth of
research about predicting the bargaining outcome under several different bargaining
processes and information structures. See Muthoo (1999) for a review of bargaining
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theory and applications in economics. One classic approach to modeling the outcome
of bargaining is to use the Nash bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution is
the outcome of a cooperative game where two parties maximize the product of their
surpluses net of their disagreement utilities. As such, the Nash bargaining solution
is a mutually beneficial agreement that splits the total surplus (net of disagreement
payoffs) equally. This classic Nash bargaining solution can be extended to the case
where the two parties have different bargaining powers, in which case the more
powerful party grabs a larger portion of the total surplus. This generalized Nash
bargaining solution is what we use to model the outcome of the negotiation between
the retailer and the customer.
There is another stream of research that focuses on the comparison of bargaining
and posted pricing. A subset of this research stream uses generalized Nash bar-
gaining to model the outcome of negotiation. Among these are Wang (1995) who
considers a seller offering an indivisible object, Bester (1993) who considers a group
of competing sellers all of whom collectively use either posted pricing or negotiation,
Roth, Woratschek, and Pastowski (2006) who consider a seller offering a customiz-
able product. In addition, other researchers have addressed the question of posted
pricing versus bargaining using embellished models of negotiation, such as alternat-
ing offers by the seller and the customer, or incomplete information. These include
Riley and Zeckhauser (1983), Arnold and Lippman (1998), Adachi (1999), Desai and
Purohit (2004). Terwiesch, Savin and Hann (2005) considers the effect of negotiation
in online haggling. Unlike all of this earlier work where the seller(s) decide whether
to use negotiation or posted pricing, we focus on a two-stage supply chain problem,
in which the retailer’s sales format choice is influenced by the manufacturer’s whole-
sale price. In addition, we explicitly account for the effect of supply chain capacity,
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which may distort the retailer and the manufacturer’s profits.
There are several recent papers that analyze negotiation in the context of supply
chain management. These include Nagarajan and Bassok (2002), Wu (2004), Iyer
and Villas-Boas (2003), Gurnani and Shi (2006), and Lovejoy (2007). For a review
on cooperative bargaining in supply chains, see Nagarajan and Sosic (2008). Most of
this work models negotiation between a supplier(s) and a buyer(s) who then meets
the end customer demand by selling at a posted price. In contrast, we examine the
sales format choice of the retailer, who may use posted pricing or negotiation when
selling to the end customers, and we analyze how this choice can be influenced by
the manufacturer whose profit also depends on the retailer’s sales format.
3.3 Model Description
We consider a supply chain comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer where
the manufacturer produces an item at a unit cost of c and sells at a unit wholesale
price, w ≥ c. After the manufacturer determines the wholesale price, the retailer
decides which of the two sales formats to adopt when selling to the end customers:
posted pricing or negotiation. If the retailer decides to adopt posted pricing, the
retailer must choose the take-it-or-leave-it price to be used. If the retailer decides
to adopt negotiation, the retailer must choose the minimum price that the retailer
is willing to accept. These specific pricing decisions determine the rules of transac-
tion between the retailer and consumers, and drive aggregate demand. The retailer
then orders from the manufacturer up to the supply chain capacity, Q. The supply
chain capacity, Q, admits multiple interpretations: It could arise from the manufac-
turer’s limited production capacity or the retailer’s storage space or working capital
constraints. We assume that the capacity, Q, is exogenously given.
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We consider an infinitesimally-divisible consumer population in which the con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the item. Let a be the size of the
consumer population and F (x) := 1 − F (x) represent the fraction of the consumer
population who values the product at x or more. Then, aF (x) can be interpreted as
the portion of the consumer population with valuation x or higher. In the remain-
der of the chapter, we refer to F (x) as the valuation distribution and we denote its
density by f(x).
3.3.1 Posted Pricing
If the retailer decides to adopt posted pricing and picks posted price p, then only
consumers with valuations p or higher will buy the product. Thus, the aggregate
demand at price p is given by D(p) := aF (p). Many commonly-used demand func-
tions are covered by this model. If the valuation distribution is uniform, then the
aggregate demand is linear in price. If the valuation distribution is exponential, then
the aggregate demand is log-linear. In addition, by picking an appropriate valuation
distribution F (·), one can model the case where the aggregate demand is given by the
logit demand function, which represents the aggregate demand of utility-maximizing
consumers, choosing between two options – ‘buy’ and ‘no buy,’ where the utility
of each option is drawn from a Gumbel distribution (for more on this, see Chapter
7.3 in Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005). Table 3.1 lists several specific examples of the
valuation distributions, and corresponding aggregate demand functions, covered by
our model.
Since the supply chain capacity is limited to Q, given posted price p and wholesale
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Valuation distribution F (p) Aggregate Demand D(p)
Uniform[0, ab ]: F (p) =
pb
a a− bp (linear demand)
Exponential(λ): F (p) = 1− e−λp ae−λp (log-linear demand)








Difference of two Gumbel r.v.’s with scale parameter 1




Table 3.1: Examples of valuation distributions and corresponding aggregate demand
functions.
price w, the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits are given by
ΠRP(p, w, Q) = (p− w) min{D(p), Q} = (p− w) min{aF (p), Q}, and (3.1)
ΠMP(w, p, Q) = (w − c) min{D(p), Q} = (w − c) min{aF (p), Q}. (3.2)
If capacity level Q is low enough, the quantity sold could be bounded by the
capacity level when the posted price is low. Let p̄(Q) be the market-clearing price
at which the demand equals the capacity: D(p̄(Q)) = Q (if it exists). Note that the
retailer will not set the price below p̄(Q). Had the retailer set a price below p̄(Q),
the retailer could increase the per-unit profit margin without changing the quantity
sold.
3.3.2 Negotiation
If the retailer decides to adopt negotiation, the retailer must determine the cut-off
price, i.e., the minimum price at which it is willing to sell, denoted by pmin. Observe
that it is not necessarily in the retailer’s best interest to sell to customers with low
valuations. Hence, the retailer may price some customers out of the market by setting
pmin high enough, and doing so could increase its profit.
Negotiation takes time and effort on the parts of both the retailer and the cus-
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tomer, which are captured by negotiation costs in our model. Let cr and cb denote the
cost of negotiation incurred by the retailer and consumer, respectively. Effectively,
the retailer’s cost, cr, reduces the retailer’s profit margin while the customer’s cost,
cb, reduces the customer’s willingness-to-pay. In addition, one of the two parties may
have more say in shaping the outcome of the negotiation, for example, the retailer
could gain more if the customer has few outside options and in a weak bargaining
position. Our model allows such asymmetry in bargaining power.
We model the outcome of negotiation between a customer and the retailer through
generalized Nash bargaining, under which the total surplus is split between the two
parties according to their relative bargaining power. The outcome of negotiation
is determined by the retailer’s cut-off price, pmin, the customer’s valuation of the
item, denoted by r and drawn from F (·), costs of negotiation, and each party’s
relative bargaining power. Generalized Nash bargaining solution models the relative
bargaining power in the form of the parameter, β ∈ (0, 1). Let β be the customer’s
relative bargaining power and 1− β the retailer’s bargaining power.
The retailer must choose the cut-off price, pmin, so that it covers at least the
wholesale price plus the retailer’s cost of negotiation: pmin ≥ w + cr. In our model, a
customer also incurs cost to negotiate, given by cb. Thus, only the consumers with
valuation pmin + cb and above will engage in negotiation and buy the item; the rest
will choose not to buy. If the final price agreed by both parties is pN, a consumer
with valuation r will obtain a surplus of r − pN − cb. For the same final price, the
retailer’s (extra) surplus beyond pmin is pN − pmin. Following the generalized Nash
bargaining solution (Muthoo 1999), a consumer with valuation r ≥ pmin + cb and a
retailer with the cut-off price pmin ≥ w + cr will agree on a final price p∗N(pmin, r) that
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maximizes the following objective function.
max
pN∈[pmin,r]
(r − pN − cb)β (pN − pmin)1−β. (3.3)
Note the significance of β, which represents the relative bargaining power of the
consumers. If β → 1, any consumer with valuation pmin + cb and above has all
the bargaining power and extracts the entire surplus after paying the final price of
p∗
N
(pmin, r) = pmin. On the other hand, if β → 0, the retailer extracts the entire
surplus by charging p∗
N
(pmin, r) = r − cb to a consumer with valuation r. For any
β ∈ (0, 1), the final price p∗
N




(pmin, r) = arg max
pN
[r − pN − cb]β × [pN − pmin]1−β
= (1− β)(r − cb) + βpmin. (3.4)
Given the cut-off price pmin, the lowest valuation among the customers who buy
is pmin + cb, which we will denote by qmin and refer to as the cut-off valuation,
qmin := pmin + cb. (3.5)




(qmin − cb, r) = (1− β)r + βqmin − cb (3.6)
If the capacity level Q is low enough and the retailer chooses the cut-off valuation
qmin so low that qmin < p̄(Q), then the demand aF (qmin) will exceed the capacity Q.
If qmin were so low, the retailer could always increase the cut-off valuation slightly,
which would increase the transaction price p∗
N
(qmin − cb, r) without decreasing the
quantity sold, thereby improving the retailer’s total profit. Hence, the retailer will
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never choose qmin < p̄(Q). By setting qmin = p̄(Q), the retailer could set demand
equal to the capacity, Q.
For any qmin ≥ max[w + cr + cb, p̄(Q)], the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits
are given by













[(1− β)x + βqmin − w − cr − cb] f(x)dx, and (3.7)
ΠMN(w, qmin, Q) = (w − c) min{D(qmin), Q} = (w − c)aF (qmin). (3.8)
Note that the retailer’s choice of qmin (equivalently, pmin) affects not only the profit
margin per unit sold, but also the portion of consumers who negotiate successfully
and buy: The larger qmin is, the higher the price paid by consumers, but the smaller
the fraction of consumers who buy. This trade-off plays a critical role when choosing
the optimal cut-off valuation.
3.3.3 Sales Format and Pricing Decisions in the Supply Chain
We first describe the problem that the retailer faces. Given capacity Q, the
retailer’s best response to the manufacturer’s wholesale price w consists of the sales
format choice and an associated pricing decision. Let IR be an indicator variable that
represents the retailer’s decision on the sales format: IR = 1 if the retailer chooses
the posted pricing strategy and IR = 0 otherwise. Let p∗(w, Q) be the maximizer
of ΠRP(p, w, Q) and q
∗
min(w, Q) the maximizer of ΠRN(qmin, w,Q) for given wholesale
price w and capacity Q. Note that p∗(w, Q) is the price that the retailer will use under
posted pricing and q∗min(w,Q) is the cut-off valuation that the retailer will use under
negotiation. Then, the retailer’s best response will be either (IR = 1, p∗(w, Q)) or
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(IR = 0, q∗min(w,Q)). Thus, for given wholesale price w and capacity Q, the retailer
solves the following problem:
max
IR∈{0,1}
[IRΠRP(p∗(w, Q), w,Q) + (1− IR)ΠRN(q∗min(w, Q), w, Q)] (3.9)
We next turn to the manufacturer’s problem. The manufacturer chooses its
wholesale price anticipating the retailer’s best response. Let I∗R(w,Q) denote the
retailer’s optimal sales format choice for a given w and Q. The manufacturer is then
solving the following problem:
max
w≥c
[I∗R(w,Q)ΠMP(w, p∗(w,Q), Q) + (1− I∗R(w, Q))ΠMN(w, q∗min(w, Q), Q)] (3.10)
Notice that in our model the retailer actively chooses one of two sales formats, posted
pricing or negotiation. As we will demonstrate, the retailer’s discretion to choose the
sales format has a crucial effect on the equilibrium outcome.
3.4 No Capacity Constraint
As a benchmark, we first analyze the case when the supply chain has sufficient
capacity to meet any demand. For example, if capacity Q is greater than or equal to
the size of consumer population, a, then the capacity plays no role. In this section,
we drop Q from the notation.
Throughout the chapter, we make the following technical assumptions on the
valuation distribution, F (·) and its density f(·). The first assumption ensures that
the retailer’s profit functions are well-behaved while the second assumption does the
same for the manufacturer’s profit functions.
(A1) The valuation distribution, F (·), is strictly increasing over the domain of non-
negative real numbers, and has an increasing failure rate.
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(A2) The density f(·) is twice differentiable and satisfies the following condition:
f ′(x)(2f ′(x)F (x) + f 2(x))− f ′′(x)f(x)F (x) ≥ 0 (3.11)
Note that these assumptions are satisfied by many valuation distributions includ-
ing those listed in Table 3.1 except for uniform. Our assumption that F (·) has an
unbounded domain is what rules out the uniform distribution. The end point of a
bounded domain causes expositional complications in the proofs, which is why we
make the assumption of unbounded domains. We should note that we have ana-
lyzed the uniform case separately, taking advantage of closed-form expressions for
the optimal solutions and profit functions. All the results stated as Proposition and
Corollary throughout the chapter continue to hold for the uniform case. Through-
out the chapter, we use increasing/decreasing and positive/negative in the weak sense
unless otherwise specified as being strict.
In preparation for characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we first analyze the
structure of the profit functions for the manufacturer and retailer under each sales
format.
3.4.1 Posted Pricing
Consider a supply chain with unlimited capacity where posted pricing is imposed
exogenously. Let Πu
RP
(p, w) and Πu
MP
(w, p) denote the retailer’s and the manufac-
turer’s profit functions under posted pricing. (Formally, Πu
RP
(p, w) and Πu
MP
(w, p)
are defined by equations (3.1) and (3.2) with Q = ∞, respectively.) The following
lemma establishes the structural properties of the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit
functions under posted pricing.
Lemma 3.4.1. [Profit functions under posted pricing]
(a) The retailer’s profit, Πu
RP
(p, w), is strictly unimodal in the posted price, p.
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(b) Let pu(w) denote the optimal posted price, that is, the maximizer of Πu
RP
(p, w).
Then, pu(w) is convex and strictly increasing in the wholesale price, w.
(c) Given that the retailer chooses the posted price optimally, the manufacturer’s
profit, Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)), is strictly unimodal in w.
We should point out that Assumption (A1) is needed for Lemma 3.4.1(a) while
Assumption (A2) is needed for Lemma 3.4.1(b), which enables us to show that the
manufacturer’s profit function is well-behaved as described in Lemma 3.4.1(c). Let
wu
P
be the maximizer of Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)). Note that wu
P
is the wholesale price that
the manufacturer will use in a supply chain where posted pricing is the exogenously
chosen sales format.
3.4.2 Negotiation
Consider a supply chain with unlimited capacity where negotiation is imposed ex-
ogenously. The next lemma establishes the structural properties of the retailer’s and
the manufacturer’s profit functions under negotiation, Πu
RN




which are defined by equations (3.7) and (3.8) with capacity Q sufficiently large.
Lemma 3.4.2. [Profit functions under negotiation]
(a) The retailer’s profit, Πu
RN
(qmin, w), is strictly unimodal in the retailer’s cut-off
valuation, qmin.




Then qumin(w) is convex and strictly increasing in w.
(c) Given that the retailer chooses the cut-off valuation optimally, the manufacturer’s
profit, Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)), is strictly unimodal in w.
Let wu
N
be the maximizer of Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)). Note that w
u
N
is the wholesale price
that the manufacturer should use in a supply chain where negotiation is the exoge-
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nously chosen sales format. Consequently, qumin(w
u
N
) would be the cut-off valuation
chosen by the retailer in such a supply chain. The next lemma states a useful prop-





) depend on the cost of negotiation for the retailer,
cr and cost of negotiation for the customer, cb.




) remain the same.
Lemma 3.4.3 implies that in a supply chain where negotiation is exogenously
chosen as the sales format, both the manufacturer wholesale price and the retailer’s
cut-off valuation depend only on the total negotiation cost, cr + cb. To see why, first
observe that the retailer’s margin per unit sold is the transaction price, p∗
N
, minus
the wholesale price, w, and the retailer’s cost of negotiation, cr. In addition, notice
from equation (3.6) that the transaction price, p∗
N
, is reduced by the customer’s cost
of negotiation, cb, which implies that the retailer absorbs the customer’s cost of
negotiation as well. Thus, for every unit sold, the retailer’s margin depends only on
the total cost of negotiation, but not on how that cost is allocated between cb and cr,
which explains the above lemma. In the remainder of this chapter, let cT := cr + cb
denote the total cost of negotiation.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Recall that, in our model, the sales format is not exogenously chosen, but the
retailer chooses the sales format to maximize its profit given the manufacturer’s
wholesale price. To characterize the equilibrium behavior in our model, we first
characterize the retailer’s best response, represented by the sales format choice and
the corresponding pricing decision, as a function of the manufacturer’s wholesale
price w.
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Proposition 3.4.1. [Retailer’s best response]
(a) If the retailer (weakly) prefers posted pricing at w = c, then the retailer strictly
prefers posted pricing for all w > c.
Otherwise (i.e., if the retailer strictly prefers negotiation at w = c):
(b) either the retailer strictly prefers negotiation at all w > c,
(c) or there exists a unique threshold ŵu
R
> c such that the retailer is indifferent
between negotiation and posted pricing if w = ŵu
R
, strictly prefers negotiation if
w < ŵu
R
, and strictly prefers posted pricing if w > ŵu
R
.
Proposition 3.4.1 implies that once the retailer prefers posted pricing at a given
wholesale price, then the retailer continues to prefer posted pricing at all higher
wholesale prices. To understand why, we first rewrite the retailer’s profit function
given by equation (3.7):
Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) = a
∫ ∞
qumin(w)
[qumin(w) + (1− β)(x− qumin(w))− w − cT] f(x)dx
= aF (qumin(w))(q
u
min(w)−w −cT) + a(1−β)Er[(r− qumin(w))+]
(3.12)
The first term in the equation above is equivalent to the expected profit under posted
pricing when the posted price is qumin(w) and the wholesale price is w + cT, leaving
the retailer a unit margin of qumin(w) − w − cT. This term is always less than the
profit that the retailer could obtain if it used posted pricing at the wholesale price w.
Therefore, had this been the only revenue obtained by the negotiating retailer, the
retailer would always be better off using posted pricing. Under negotiation, however,
only the marginal customer (with valuation qmin) yields a margin precisely equal to
qumin(w) − w − cT, and customers with higher valuations yield higher margins (see
equation (3.6)). In fact, a customer with valuation r > qumin(w) leaves an additional
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(1 − β)(r − qumin(w)) on top of what the marginal customer yields. We refer to this
difference as the price premium. The second term represents the expected price
premium the retailer collects under negotiation. If this term is sufficiently large,
then the retailer would be better off under negotiation. Now, note that the second
term in (3.12), which represents the expected premium, could be rewritten as
a(1− β)F (qumin(w))Er[r − qumin(w)|r ≥ qumin(w)].
As the wholesale price w and, hence, the cut-off valuation qumin(w) increase, the ex-
pected premium decreases under our assumption that the valuation distribution has
IFR.1 Therefore, as w increases, the benefit from negotiation decreases, which makes
negotiation less attractive at higher wholesale prices, as indicated by Proposition
3.4.1.
It is interesting to note that Proposition 3.4.1 will not hold if the valuation
distribution has decreasing failure rate (DFR). In such a case, the mean residual
valuation could increase in w, which would make negotiation more attractive at
higher wholesale prices. In fact, the following figure shows a counter-example to
Proposition 3.4.1 for a DFR valuation distribution. Nonetheless, many commonly
used aggregate demand functions, including those listed in Table 3.1, are based on
valuation distributions with IFR.
Observe from Proposition 3.4.1 that there may exist a wholesale price ŵu
R
that
makes the retailer indifferent between the two sales formats. The following proposi-
tion states that at such a wholesale price, the manufacturer prefers negotiation.
Proposition 3.4.2. Suppose there exists ŵu
R
> c that makes the retailer indifferent
between negotiation and posted pricing, as described in Proposition 3.4.1(c). At the
1The technical property that allows this result is that a random variable with IFR distribution
has a decreasing mean residual lifetime.
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Figure 3.1: The figure illustrates the counter-example to Proposition 3.4.1. In this
example, the retailer prefers posted pricing at lower wholesale prices
and negotiation at higher wholesale prices. Here, a = 200, 000, β = 0.8,



















Hence, negotiation is the Pareto-optimal sales format when the wholesale price is
ŵu
R
, and applying the Pareto-dominance criterion, we assume that the retailer chooses
negotiation whenever w = ŵu
R
.2
Based on the structure of the best response established in Propositions 3.4.1 and
3.4.2, the manufacturer’s problem of selecting the wholesale price, stated in equation
(3.10), can now be expressed as follows:
Manufacturer’s Problem:






2Such tie-breaking behavior on the part of the retailer can be easily induced by choosing the
wholesale price ŵuR − ε for arbitrarily small ε > 0.
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If the retailer prefers negotiation for c ≤ w ≤ ŵu
R
















The manufacturer’s problems in (3.13) and (3.14) correspond to Proposition
3.4.1(a) and (b), where the retailer’s sales format choice cannot be influenced by
the manufacturer’s wholesale price. On the other hand, if Proposition 3.4.1(c) holds,
with the retailer’s discretion in mind, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price
to induce either negotiation (i.e., c ≤ w ≤ ŵu
R
) or posted pricing (i.e., w > ŵu
R
),
whichever yields a larger profit for the manufacturer. The next proposition shows
that the manufacturer will choose one of three wholesale prices, leading to one of
three forms of equilibria:
Proposition 3.4.3. The manufacturer chooses one of the following wholesale prices:
(a) wu
N
, the maximizer of Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)), which leads the retailer to use negotiation
with cut-off valuation qumin(w
u
N
) in equilibrium, or
(b) ŵu
R




) in equilibrium, or
(c) wu
P
, the maximizer of Πu
MP




The equilibrium outcome described in Proposition 3.4.3(a) is the same outcome
that would arise if the supply chain were exogenously restricted to use negotiation.
Likewise, the equilibrium outcome in Proposition 3.4.3(c) is the one that would arise
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if the supply chain were exogenously restricted to use posted pricing. Proposition
3.4.3(b), on the other hand, shows that there is a different type of negotiation equi-
librium that gives rise to a different wholesale price. This type of equilibrium is a
consequence of the retailer’s discretion over the sales format. It arises when the man-
ufacturer would like to induce the retailer to choose negotiation, but cannot do so at
the wholesale price wu
N
. In such cases, the manufacturer offers a discounted wholesale
price, ŵu
R
, thereby sacrificing some of its profit margin in order to induce its preferred
sales format. We refer to this form of equilibrium as reconciliatory negotiation.
The total cost of negotiation, cT, influences which of the three candidates arises as
an equilibrium. The following proposition characterizes how the equilibrium changes
with respect to cT.
Proposition 3.4.4. There exist two thresholds, cT and cT, cT ≤ cT, such that
(a) [Negotiation] if cT < cT, then the equilibrium sales format is negotiation with
the wholesale price wu
N




(b) [Reconciliatory Negotiation] if cT ≤ cT < cT, then the equilibrium sales format
is negotiation with the wholesale price ŵu
R





(c) [Posted Pricing] if cT ≥ cT, then the equilibrium sales format is posted price
with the wholesale price wu
P
, resulting in the posted price pu(wu
P
).
The behavior described in Proposition 3.4.4 is illustrated in Figure 3.2. When
the total cost of negotiation is sufficiently low (i.e., cT < cT, with cT ≈ 1.3 in the
figure), negotiation is preferred by both the retailer and the manufacturer. In such
cases, the manufacturer can induce negotiation without giving up any of its profit
margin. In contrast, as cT increases, it becomes harder for the manufacturer to
induce the retailer to adopt negotiation. Hence, in the middle region (cT ≤ cT < cT,
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from approximately 1.3 to 1.575 in the figure), the manufacturer finds it necessary
to offer a reduced wholesale price to induce negotiation, resulting in a reconciliatory
negotiation equilibrium. Finally, when cT becomes sufficiently large (i.e., cT ≥ cT,
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Figure 3.2: The figure illustrates the equilibrium sales quantity (left), the equilibrium
wholesale price and equilibrium posted price or cut-off valuation (cen-
tral), and the equilibrium manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits (right).
Here, a = 500, β = 0.3, c = 4 and logit demand with F (x) = 1
1+e20−x
.
It is rather surprising to note that the retailer’s equilibrium profit and quantity
sold may actually increase in the total cost of negotiation, cT. In the region where
negotiation is used, we observe from Figure 3.2 that the wholesale price continues
to decrease as cT increases, implying that the manufacturer is absorbing some of
the increased cost of negotiation. This reduction in wholesale price becomes more
pronounced in the reconciliatory negotiation region. In fact, our analysis shows that,
in this region where the equilibrium wholesale price is ŵu
R
, a unit increase in the
total cost of negotiation triggers a wholesale price reduction of more than one unit
(see Lemma B.1.2(b) in Appendix A). In other words, the manufacturer more than
compensates the retailer for the increase in cT so that negotiation remains to be the
equilibrium sales format. This explains why the retailer’s profit and quantity sold
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increase in cT under the reconciliatory negotiation regime.
3.5 Capacity Constraint
Building on our analysis of the unlimited capacity case, we now return to the
original problem where the supply chain has a finite capacity, Q. In particular, we
assume Q is smaller than the size of the consumer population, a. As in the previous
section, we first characterize the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profit functions under
each sales format.
3.5.1 Posted Pricing
Consider a supply chain with capacity Q, where posted pricing is imposed. If
capacity Q is sufficiently low, the retailer will set the posted price to the market-
clearing price, p̄(Q), (as described in Section 3.3.1) at which the demand equals the
capacity Q: aF (p̄(Q)) = Q. Define the market-clearing wholesale price under posted
pricing, wP(Q), as follows:
pu(wP(Q)) = p̄(Q). (3.16)
Observe that if the wholesale price is wP(Q), the retailer in a supply chain with
unlimited capacity finds it optimal to sell Q units under posted pricing. Notice the
significance of wP(Q). In the supply chain with capacity Q, if the wholesale price w
is less than wP(Q), then the retailer’s optimal posted price, p
∗(w, Q), is the market-
clearing price, p̄(Q) (since lowering the posted price any further will not increase sales
quantity). On the other hand, if the wholesale price w exceeds the market-clearing
wholesale price, wP(Q), then the capacity is no longer binding, and the retailer’s
optimal posted price, p∗(w, Q), is simply the price that is optimal in the supply
chain with unlimited capacity, pu(w). Note that if Q is sufficiently large, there may
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not exist wP(Q) > c. In other words, it may not be possible to induce the retailer to
sell Q units. In such cases, we follow the convention of setting wP(Q) = −∞. Based
on these observations, when the capacity of the supply chain is Q, the retailer’s
optimal profit under posted pricing is
ΠRP(p
∗(w, Q), w, Q) =





(pu(w), w) for w ≥ max{c, wP(Q)}.
(3.17)
Consequently, the manufacturer’s profit under posted pricing is
ΠMP(w, p
∗(w, Q), Q) =

(w − c)Q for c ≤ w ≤ wP(Q),
a(w − c)F (pu(w))
= Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)) for w ≥ max{c, wP(Q)}.
(3.18)
Notice from (3.18) that the manufacturer would never set the wholesale price
below wP(Q), since a lower wholesale price would only decrease the unit profit margin,
but the sales quantity would remain steady at Q. If the optimal wholesale price under
posted pricing in a supply chain with unlimited capacity, wu
P
, is greater than wP(Q),
then wu
P
will result in a sales quantity less than the supply chain’s capacity Q. In such
a case, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is simply wu
P
. On the other hand,
if wu
P
≤ wP(Q), then the manufacturer should set the wholesale price to wP(Q). The
following lemma formalizes this discussion on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale
price under posted pricing in a supply chain with capacity Q, w∗
P
(Q).
Lemma 3.5.1. For a given Q, w∗
P
(Q) = max{wP(Q), wuP}.
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3.5.2 Negotiation
Now consider a supply chain with capacity Q, where negotiation is imposed. If
capacity Q is sufficiently low, the retailer will find it optimal to sell all Q units by
setting the cut-off valuation exactly equal to p̄(Q) (as described in Section 3.3.2)
at which the demand equals the capacity Q. Following the same line of logic used
above, we define the market-clearing wholesale price under negotiation, wN(Q) as
follows:
qumin(wN(Q)) = p̄(Q) (3.19)
When there does not exist wN(Q) > c for a given Q, we follow the convention of




min(w, Q), w,Q) =

ΠRN(p̄(Q), w, Q) for c ≤ w ≤ wN(Q),
Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ max{c, wN(Q)}.
(3.20)
Consequently, the manufacturer’s profit under negotiation is
ΠMN(w, q
∗
min(w, Q), Q) =

(w − c)Q for c ≤ w ≤ wN(Q),
Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)) for w ≥ max{c, wN(Q)}.
(3.21)
The following lemma describes the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price under
negotiation in a supply chain with capacity Q, w∗
N
(Q).
Lemma 3.5.2. For a given Q, w∗
N
(Q) = max{wN(Q), wuN}.
3.5.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Recall that the retailer in our model chooses the sales format to maximize its
profit given the manufacturer’s wholesale price. In the previous section, we showed
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that the retailer will prefer negotiation at low wholesale prices, and posted pricing at
high wholesale prices. However, it is not obvious that this behavior will remain true
in the presence of finite capacity. When the capacity is finite, there will be a range of
wholesale prices over which the quantity sold hits the capacity ceiling under one sales
format, but not the other. In fact, one can easily find examples where negotiation is
bounded by capacity when posted pricing is not, and vice versa. At such wholesale
prices, the retailer’s preference is distorted by the capacity effect, which may tip the
scales in favor of one or the other sales format. Despite such complications, we show
that the same best response behavior holds true in the presence of finite capacity.
That is, as stated in Proposition 3.4.1, three possibilities exist: (a) either the retailer
prefers posted pricing at all wholesale prices, or (b) the retailer prefers negotiation
at all wholesale prices, or (c) there exists a threshold wholesale price ŵR(Q) > c
below which the retailer strictly prefers negotiation and above which the retailer
strictly prefers posted pricing. The proof is more involved due to the complications
arising from the capacity constraint. We state and prove this result formally as
Proposition B.2.1 in Appendix B. Furthermore, an equivalent of Proposition 3.4.2
holds for the limited capacity problem: If there exists ŵR(Q) > c below which
the retailer strictly prefers negotiation and above which it prefers posted pricing
(while being indifferent at ŵR(Q)), then the manufacturer prefers negotiation at the
wholesale price ŵR(Q). Therefore, applying the Pareto-dominance criterion, we again
assume that the retailer chooses to negotiate at the threshold wholesale price ŵR(Q).
This result is stated and proven formally as Proposition B.2.2 in Appendix B.
Given the three possible patterns of the retailer’s preference as a function of the
wholesale price, the manufacturer’s problem to determine the wholesale price can
now be expressed as follows:
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Manufacturer’s Problem:




∗(w, Q), Q) (3.22)






If the retailer prefers negotiation for c ≤ w ≤ ŵR(Q) and posted pricing for













The next proposition describes the candidates for the manufacturer’s optimal
wholesale price and the resulting equilibria:
Proposition 3.5.1. The manufacturer chooses one of the following wholesale prices:
(a) w∗
N
(Q) = max{wN(Q), wuN}, the maximizer of ΠMN(w, q∗min(w, Q), Q), which leads
the retailer to use negotiation with cut-off valuation q∗min(w
∗
N
(Q), Q) in equilibrium
(b) ŵR(Q), the threshold wholesale price, which leads the retailer to use negotiation
with cut-off valuation q∗min(ŵR(Q), Q) in equilibrium, or
(c) w∗
P
(Q) = max{wP(Q), wuP}, the maximizer of ΠMP(w, p∗(w,Q), Q), which leads
the retailer to use posted pricing with price p∗(w∗
P
(Q), Q) in equilibrium.
The equilibrium wholesale price ŵR(Q) arises in cases where the manufacturer
would like the retailer to use negotiation, but cannot induce that choice at the whole-
sale price w∗
N
(Q) that maximizes the profit function ΠMN(w, q
∗
min(w, Q), Q). Hence,
in such cases, the manufacturer offers the lower wholesale price ŵR(Q) in order to
persuade the retailer to use negotiation, which gives rise to what we termed rec-
onciliatory negotiation in Section 3.4. An analog of Proposition 3.4.4 holds in the
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capacitated case as well: As the total cost of negotiation, cT, increases, the supply
chain moves from the negotiation equilibrium with wholesale price w∗
N
(Q) to the
reconciliatory negotiation equilibrium with wholesale price ŵR(Q) and eventually to
the posted pricing equilibrium with wholesale price w∗
P
(Q). The result is stated and
proven formally in Appendix B (see Proposition B.2.3).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the same example shown in Figure 3.2, but in a capacity-
constrained supply chain with Q = 406. As in the case with unlimited capacity, the
equilibrium moves from negotiation (cT up to approximately 1.29) to reconciliatory
negotiation (cT between 1.29 and 1.42 approximately) to posted pricing (cT above
approximately 1.42). Observe that the quantity sold in equilibrium is bounded by
capacity in two disjoint regions. The first region (cT between 0.5 to 0.72) is when the
total cost of negotiation is very low, in which the manufacturer prefers to exhaust
the capacity and it induces this outcome by charging the market-clearing wholesale
price, wN(Q). The second region (cT between 1.31 to 1.42) spans a part of the region
where the equilibrium is reconciliatory negotiation with wholesale price ŵR(Q). As
previously discussed, a unit increase in cT decreases ŵR(Q) by more than one unit,
so it eventually becomes smaller than the market-clearing wholesale price, wN(Q).
Notice if negotiation were exogenously imposed, the manufacturer would never pick
a wholesale price below wN(Q). However, facing a retailer who has the discretion
to choose the sales format, the manufacturer has to sacrifice some of its margin and
offer ŵR(Q) to induce negotiation.
Figure 3.4 illustrates an example where capacity is more severely constrained
with Q = 350. In this case, regardless of cT the capacity is exhausted. Even though
the equilibrium is moving from negotiation to reconciliatory negotiation to posted
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Figure 3.3: The figure illustrates the equilibrium sales quantity (left), the equilibrium
wholesale price and equilibrium posted price or cut-off valuation (cen-
tral), and the equilibrium manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits (right).
Here, a = 500, β = 0.3, c = 4, Q = 406 and logit demand with
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Figure 3.4: The figure illustrates the equilibrium sales quantity (left), the equilibrium
wholesale price and equilibrium posted price or cut-off valuation (cen-
tral), and the equilibrium manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits (right).
Here, a = 500, β = 0.3, c = 4, Q = 350 and logit demand with
F (x) = 1
1+e20−x
.
Observe from Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 where the capacity progressively becomes
tighter, different types of equilibria may arise at the same total cost of negotiation, cT
as capacity is changing. For example, the range of cT values in which posted pricing is
the equilibrium expands as the capacity becomes tighter: above 1.575 in Figure 3.2,
above 1.42 in Figure 3.3, and above 1.215 in Figure 3.4. As the following proposition
shows, the equilibrium sales format evolves from posted pricing to negotiation as the
capacity becomes larger, giving rise to the reconciliatory negotiation equilibrium at
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moderate capacity levels.
Proposition 3.5.2. There exist two thresholds, Q and Q, 0 ≤ Q ≤ Q ≤ ∞, such
that
(a) [Posted Pricing] if Q < Q, then the equilibrium sales format is posted pric-
ing with the wholesale price w∗
P




(b) [Reconciliatory Negotiation] if Q ≤ Q < Q, then the equilibrium sales for-
mat is negotiation with the wholesale price ŵR(Q), resulting in the retailer’s cut-off
valuation q∗min(ŵR(Q), Q), and
(c) [Negotiation] if Q ≥ Q, then the equilibrium sales format is negotiation with
the wholesale price w∗
N





As the proposition shows, when capacity is tight, the equilibrium is posted pric-
ing. To understand this behavior, first recall that the additional revenue from using
negotiation (instead of posted pricing) arises from the premium collected from cus-
tomers with high valuations. We have seen earlier that this additional revenue gets
smaller as the cut-off valuation increases. In a setting with tight capacity, no matter
what sales format is used, the retailer will sell only to customers with high valu-
ations, resulting in a high posted price (if posted pricing is used) or high cut-off
valuation (if negotiation is used). Hence, in such a setting, the additional revenue
from negotiation will be small and may not cover the cost of negotiation. This is why
posted pricing is preferred when capacity is tight. As capacity increases, the manu-
facturer would prefer if the supply chain used negotiation, but cannot induce it at
the wholesale price w∗
N
(Q), which is the wholesale price the manufacturer would use
if it could simply dictate the retailer to use negotiation. Hence, at moderate capac-
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ity levels, the manufacturer induces reconciliatory negotiation through a discounted
wholesale price. Finally, once the capacity is large enough, the retailer becomes in-
creasingly willing to use negotiation, and the equilibrium becomes negotiation, where
the wholesale price is w∗
N
(Q).
The monotonic behavior of the equilibrium sales format with respect to capac-
ity Q and total cost of negotiation cT gives rise to the following corollary, which
characterizes switching curves that separate different types of equilibria. Figure 3.5
illustrates three equilibrium regimes separated by two switching curves, stated in the
corollary.
Corollary 3.5.1. There exist two increasing switching curves, Q(cT) and Q(cT),
Q(cT) ≤ Q(cT), such that the equilibrium is posted pricing if Q < Q(cT), reconcilia-












Figure 3.5: The figure illustrates three types of equilibria: Negotiation, Reconcilia-
tory Negotiation and Posted Pricing. Here, a = 500, β = 0.6, c = 4, and
logit demand with F (x) = 1
1+e20−x
.
We now examine the effect of disparity in bargaining powers of the retailer and
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customers. Figure 3.6 shows how the equilibrium outcome changes as the customer’s
relative bargaining power, β, increases. The behavior of equilibrium is similar to
the behavior with respect to the total cost of negotiation, cT: As β increases, the
equilibrium sales format changes from negotiation to reconciliatory negotiation to
posted pricing. At lower values of β, the retailer is able to extract much of the
customer surplus, and the supply chain ends up using negotiation. As β increases,
the retailer’s ability to extract customer surplus is hampered, making the retailer
more reluctant to choose negotiation. The manufacturer is willing to reduce the
wholesale price to keep negotiation alive, and the discount is especially sharp at
moderate values of β, resulting in reconciliatory negotiation. Once the depth of the
discount needed to induce negotiation becomes too large, the manufacturer gives
up on negotiation. The wholesale price increases and posted pricing becomes the
equilibrium. Although this behavior can be intuitively explained, an analytical proof
is difficult because of the highly non-linear dependence of the transaction price (and



























Figure 3.6: The figure illustrates the equilibrium wholesale price and equilibrium
posted price or cut-off valuation (left) and the equilibrium manufacturer’s
and the retailer’s profits (right). Here, a = 500, c = 4, cT = 0.75, Q = 400





In this chapter, we consider how the supply chain capacity influences the pricing
and sales format decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. We propose a model
in which the supply chain has a limited supply and the retailer can choose either
of two pricing regimes – negotiating or posting a fixed price when selling a product
to heterogeneous customers with different willingness-to-pay. The generalized Nash
bargaining solution is employed to characterize the outcome of negotiation between
customers and the retailer. Costs of negotiation are incurred when customers and
the retailer have reached an equilibrium transaction price. We consider unlimited
capacity and limited capacity cases, and show how the capacity and the negotia-
tion cost affect the retailer’s pricing regime decisions as well as the manufacturer’s
inducement of a pricing regime through the wholesale price.
Our result shows there exist three types of equilibria depending on the negotia-
tion cost and the capacity of the supply chain. When the negotiation cost is very
low and the capacity of the manufacturer is very high, the supply chain ends up at a
negotiation equilibrium, which is as same as that if negotiation were the exogenous
sales format. When the negotiation cost is very high and the capacity of the manu-
facturer is very low, the supply chain ends up at a posted price equilibrium, which
is again the same as that if posted pricing were the exogenous sales format. The
third equilibrium, where the negotiation cost and the capacity level are sufficiently
high, exists when the manufacturer prefers the retailer to use negotiation but it has




One of the strategic decisions available to a retailer is the choice of sales format –
whether to adopt negotiation or posted pricing. Much of operations management lit-
erature makes the implicit assumption that the retailer’s sales format is exogenously
fixed as posted pricing. This is a perfectly acceptable starting point as posted pric-
ing is very common in practice. Nonetheless, many retailers actively choose between
posted pricing and negotiation. This dissertation revisits two problem domains in
operations management, assuming that a retailer can make an active choice about
sales formats. Namely, we first consider a retailer’s revenue management problem
in the presence of inventory considerations, assuming that the retailer can negoti-
ate. Second, we consider a capacity-constrained manufacturer’s wholesale pricing
problem, assuming that the retailer is free to choose between posted pricing and
negotiation.
The traditional revenue management paradigm suggests that if a retailer has a
limited supply of a product that can be sold only over a short selling season, then
the retailer must adjust its prices over time (i.e., use dynamic pricing) in order to
maximize the revenue to be collected over the selling season. Negotiation can be seen
as yet another revenue management tool, in that negotiation allows a retailer to price
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discriminate among customers. In this dissertation, a stochastic dynamic program-
ming formulation is employed to embed a negotiation model in a more traditional
dynamic pricing model. This model produces a number of interesting analytical and
numerical results. As one would expect, the optimal posted price of a negotiating
retailer includes a premium over that of a retailer using take-it-or-leave-it pricing
strategy. This price premium helps the retailer extract more revenues from cus-
tomers with high willingness-to-pay, and, surprisingly, peaks at moderate inventory
levels (as opposed to low inventory levels). In addition, the results show that nego-
tiation can act as a substitute or complement to dynamic pricing. For example, at
moderate inventory levels, the benefit from dynamic pricing increases further when
the seller can negotiate.
If negotiation is a viable sales format choice for the retailer, the manufacturer
must take such retailer discretion into account. In our analysis, we find that the
supply chain may settle in one of the three different types of equilibria. Two of
these three are cases where the supply chain ends up doing what it would do even
if the retailer had no discretion and the sales format were exogenously determined.
The third equilibrium type, however, arises when the manufacturer wants to impose
negotiation, but cannot induce the retailer to do so without sacrificing some of its
profit margin. This is an equilibrium where the retailer benefits from its discretion
over the sales format. We establish how the type of equilibrium outcome depends
on the supply chain capacity and retailer’s cost of negotiation. We find that the
retailer benefits from its power to choose the sales format when negotiation costs
and capacity levels are moderately high.
In our negotiation models, be it in the context of revenue management problem
or the wholesale pricing problem, the retailer sets a minimum acceptable price and
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serves only those customers who are willing to pay more. In this setting, customers
pay different prices depending on their willingness-to-pay, and such price discrimi-
nation is exactly the reason why the retailer benefits from negotiation. With regard
to the benefits from negotiation, a common theme emerges across the revenue man-
agement and wholesale pricing problems. In the revenue management problem, we
find that the benefit of negotiation is larger when the retailer has more inventory at
the beginning of the horizon. In the wholesale pricing problem, we find that benefit
from negotiation is larger when the manufacturer has larger capacity. These results






A.1 Proofs of Lemmas in Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1





≥ 0, (ii) ∂
2S(po,r)
∂p2o
< 0 whenever ∂S(po,r)
∂po
= 0, and (iii) S(po, r) → (r − p)
as po → p.
First note that the first and second partial derivatives of S(po, r) in po are
∂S(po, r)
∂po
= −G(po|p) + (r − po)g(po|p) and (A.1)
∂2S(po, r)
∂p2o
= (r − po)g′(po|p)− 2g(po|p). (A.2)
Claim (i) follows from (A.1) and G(0|p) = 0 while claim (iii) follows from G(p|p) = 1.











Since G(po|p) is log-concave, G(po|p)g′(po|p) − g2(po|p) < 0 at any po in [0, p] and
claim (ii) follows, concluding the proof of unimodality of S(po, r) in po ∈ [0, p].
Proof of (b): Note that S(po, r) = 0 for all po ≤ 0 since G(po|p) = 0 for all po ≤ 0.
Furthermore, for all po ≥ p, we have S(po, r) = r − po (since G(po|p) = 1 for all
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po ≥ p) and S(po, r) is strictly decreasing in po for po ≥ p.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2
We divide into two cases: p ≥ θ and p < θ.
First, consider the case with p ≥ θ. For bargainers with ρ(p− θ) < r ≤ ρ(p), we
have p − θ < p̄o(r) ≤ p, thus p∗o(p, r) = p̄o(r) is the optimal solution to (2.2). On
the other hand, for bargainers with r ∈ [p− θ, ρ(p− θ)], we have p̄o(r) < p− θ, thus
the optimal offer should lie on the boundary p∗o(p, r) = p− θ (by the unimodality of
S(po, r) for po ∈ [0, p]). Likewise, for bargainers with r > ρ(p), we have p̄o(r) = p,
thus the optimal offer should lie on the boundary, that is, p∗o(p, r) = p.
Next, consider the case p < θ. Notice that ρ(p−θ) = 0 in this case. Therefore, the
only r that satisfies p−θ ≤ r ≤ ρ(p−θ) is r = 0, at which the optimal offer is trivially
p∗o(p, r) = 0. For any bargainer with 0 < r ≤ ρ(p), we have p − θ < 0 < p̄o(r) ≤ p,
and p∗o(p, r) = p̄o(r) is the optimal solution to (2.2). If r > ρ(p), we have p̄o(r) = p,
and the optimal offer is on the boundary p∗o(p, r) = p.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3
Suppose that p < ∆t−1(y). Note that any bargainer who purchases the product will
pay p or less. Therefore, Kt(p, y) ≤ pBt(p, y) and
Jt(p, y) = λq [Kt(p, y)−Bt(p, y)∆t−1(y)] + λ(1− q)F (p) [p−∆t−1(y)] + Vt−1(y)
≤ λ[qBt(p, y) + (1− q)F (p)](p−∆t−1(y)) + Vt−1(y) < Vt−1(y).
The seller would have been strictly better off by charging p = ∆t−1(y) and setting
the counter-offer to ∆t−1(y) to all bargainers, since we would have Jt(p, y) = Vt−1(y)
in that case. Hence, setting p < ∆t−1(y) cannot be optimal.
80
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4








< 0 whenever ∂Zt(pc,y)
∂pc
= 0, and (iii) Zt(pc, y) → Vt−1(y) as pc → ρ(p− θ).
Using ∆t−1(y) = Vt−1(y)−Vt−1(y− 1), y = 0, 1, . . ., we write the first and second





F (ρ(p− θ))− F (p− θ)






F (ρ(p− θ))− F (p− θ)
(f ′(pc)(∆t−1(y)− pc)− 2f(pc)). (A.5)
Claims (i) and (iii) easily follow from simple algebra. For claim (ii), we note from









f(pc)(F (ρ(p− θ))− F (p− θ))
(−2f 2(pc)− (F (ρ(p− θ))− F (pc))f ′(pc)).
(A.6)
Now consider two cases - f ′(pc) ≥ 0 and f ′(pc) < 0. If f ′(pc) ≥ 0, then (A.6)
is negative, which is the desired result. Next, consider the case where f ′(pc) <
0. Note that, from Assumption 2 (i.e., F is strictly increasing and IFR), we have








−2f 2(pc)− (1− F (pc))f ′(pc) + (1− F (ρ(p− θ)))f ′(pc)
f(pc)(F (ρ(p− θ))− F (p− θ))
<
−f 2(pc)− (1− F (pc))f ′(pc) + (1− F (ρ(p− θ)))f ′(pc)
f(pc)(F (ρ(p− θ))− F (p− θ))
< 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3.5
It is not hard to see that the counter-offer will never be less than ∆t−1(y). If po = p−θ,
then the optimal solution to the optimization problem in (2.8) is pct(y), since Zt(pc, y)
is unimodal in pc. Likewise, if po > p − θ, then the seller will set its counter-offer
to the smaller of p or ρ(po), provided that min{ρ(po), p} is larger than or equal to
∆t−1(y).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.6
Throughout the proof, recall that a bargainer with reservation price r such that
r < p− θ will quit without making an offer. We first deal with the case where p > θ.
(a) Suppose p ≤ pct(y) ≤ ρ(p− θ). We divide the remaining bargainers into two
groups with respect to reservation price: (i) r ∈ [p − θ, ρ(p − θ)], (ii) r > ρ(p − θ).
In case (i), p∗o(p, r) = p− θ by Lemma 2.3.2 and p∗ct(p, p− θ, y) = p by Lemma 2.3.5,
as a result of which the bargainer accepts the counter-offer only if r ≥ p. In case
(ii), p∗o(p, r) > p− θ by Lemma 2.3.2 and p∗ct(p, p∗o(p, r), y) = p by Lemma 2.3.5, as a
result of which the bargainer will accept the offer. Thus, only bargainers with r ≥ p
will purchase, and Kt(p, y) = pF (p) and Bt(p, y) = F (p).
(b) Suppose ∆t−1(y) ≤ pct(y) < p ≤ ρ(p − θ). Again, consider two cases: (i)
r ∈ [p−θ, ρ(p−θ)], (ii) r > ρ(p−θ). In case (i), p∗o(p, r) = p−θ by Lemma 2.3.2 and
p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) = pct(y) by Lemma 2.3.5, as a result of which the bargainer accepts
the counter-offer only if r ≥ pct(y). In case (ii), p∗o(p, r) > p− θ by Lemma 2.3.2 and
p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p by Lemma 2.3.5, as a result of which the bargainer will accept
the offer. Thus, bargainers with pct(y) ≤ r ≤ ρ(p − θ) will purchase at pct(y), and
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bargainers with r > ρ(p− θ) will end up buying at p. The result follows.
(c) Suppose ∆t−1(y) ≤ pct(y) ≤ ρ(p − θ) < p. We divide remaining bargainers
into three groups: (i) r ∈ [p − θ, ρ(p − θ)], (ii) ρ(p − θ) < r ≤ p, and (iii) r > p.
By Lemma 2.3.2, the bargainers in group (i) offer p∗o(p, r) = p − θ, to which the
seller responds with the counter-offer p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) = pct(y) (by Lemma 2.3.5), as
a result of which the bargainer accepts the counter-offer only if r ≥ pct(y). For the
bargainers in group (ii), p∗o(p, r) > p − θ by Lemma 2.3.2 and p∗ct(p, p∗o(p, r), y) = r
by Lemma 2.3.5, as a result of which the bargainer will accept the seller’s offer.
For the bargainers in group (iii), the seller responds with p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p by
Lemma 2.3.5, thus the bargainer will buy at the posted price p. Thus, bargainers
with pct(y) ≤ r ≤ ρ(p− θ) will purchase at pct(y), and bargainers with r > ρ(p− θ)
will end up buying at min[p, r]. The result follows.
(d) Suppose ρ(p− θ) ≤ ∆t−1(y) ≤ p. As in part (c), we consider three cases: (i)
r ∈ [p − θ, ρ(p − θ)], (ii) ρ(p − θ) < r ≤ p, and (iii) r > p. By Lemma 2.3.2, the
bargainers in group (i) offer p∗o(p, r) = p − θ, to which the seller responds with the
counter-offer p∗ct(p, p− θ, y) = ∆t−1(y) (Lemma 2.3.5). Since ρ(p− θ) ≤ ∆t−1(y), no
bargainers in this group will purchase the product. Bargainers with r ∈ (ρ(p− θ), p]
make an offer greater than p− θ, to which the seller responds with the counter-offer
max[∆t−1(y), r]. Thus, only those with r ∈ [∆t−1(y), p] purchase the product and
they do so at their own reservation price. For the bargainers in group (iii), the seller
responds with p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p by Lemma 2.3.5, thus the bargainer will buy at
the posted price p. The result follows.
As for the case where p ≤ θ, cases (a) and (b) of the lemma do not even arise.
The proof of cases (c) and (d) are the same as before.
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A.2 Proofs of Lemmas in Section 2.4
In this appendix, we prove Lemmas 2.4.1 through 2.4.3 stated in Section 2.4.
The proofs utilize Lemmas A.2.1 through A.2.3, stated and proven at the end of
Appendix A.2.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
By Lemma A.2.3, ∆t−1(y) ≤ b. Therefore, we have
∆t−1(y)
2














< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , 4) θ >
2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) . For each of four cases, we
apply the results of Lemmas A.2.1 and A.2.2, write the expected revenue-to-go as a
function of the posted price and determine the optimal posted price for each case.
Case 1: θ ≤ ∆t−1(y)
2
We divide into sub-cases depending on the value of p: 1a) ∆t−1(y) ≤ p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)2 ,
1b) b+∆t−1(y)
2
< p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ, and 1c) b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ < p ≤ b.
• Case 1a: ∆t−1(y) ≤ p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)2
From Lemma A.2.1, bargainers with r ∈ [p−θ, 2(p−θ)] choose p∗o(p, r) = p−θ
and bargainers with even higher reservation price (i.e., 2(p−θ) < r < b) choose
po(p, r) = min[p,
r
2
]. From Lemma A.2.2, the seller responds with a unilateral
counter-offer p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p regardless of the bargainer’s offer. As a
result, only bargainers with reservation price greater than p will buy and they
will buy at the original posted price p. Thus, we have
Kt(p, y) = p
b− p
b





Substituting these into equation (2.6), the expected revenue-to-go function for
a given posted price p, Jt(p, y) is








+ λ(1− q)b− p
b
[p−∆t−1(y)]




Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y) = λ
b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
≥ 0 for all p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
2
.




• Case 1b: b+∆t−1(y)
2
< p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ
First, note that 2(p − θ) ≥ b + ∆t−1(y) − 2θ ≥ b ≥ b+∆t−1(y)2 > 0. Applying
this to Lemma A.2.1, we notice that all bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, b] choose
p∗o(p, r) = p − θ. From Lemma A.2.2, the seller responds with a counter-offer
p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) =
b+∆t−1(y)
2
. As a result, bargainers with reservation price
greater than b+∆t−1(y)
2
will buy at price b+∆t−1(y)
2










Substituting these into equation (2.6), we have













= Vt−1(y) + λq
(b−∆t−1(y))2
4b
+ λ(1− q)b− p
b
[p−∆t−1(y)] .
Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y) = λ(1− q)
b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
< 0 for all p > b+∆t−1(y)
2
.
Thus Jt(p, y) is decreasing in p from p =
b+∆t−1(y)
2




• Case 1c: b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ < p ≤ b
Here the posted price is even larger than Case 1b and, once again from Lemma
A.2.1, all bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, b] choose p∗o(p, r) = p − θ. From Lemma
A.2.2, the seller responds with a counter-offer p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p − θ. As a
result, bargainers with reservation price greater than p − θ will buy at price
p− θ. Thus, we have
Kt(p, y) =
b− p + θ
b
(p− θ) and Bt(p, y) =
b− p + θ
b
.
Substituting these into equation (2.6), we have
Jt(p, y) = Vt−1(y) + λq
[
b− p + θ
b







Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe for all p > b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ
J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− 2(p− θ) + ∆t−1(y)
b
+ λ(1− q)b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
< 0.




Combining three cases, it is easy to see that Jt(p, y) is increasing in p up to p =
b+∆t−1(y)
2






< θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
Similar to the previous case, we consider five different ranges of p: 2a) ∆t−1(y) ≤ p <
θ+ ∆t−1(y)
2
, 2b) θ+ ∆t−1(y)
2









+ θ < p ≤ b.
• Case 2a: ∆t−1(y) ≤ p < θ + ∆t−1(y)2
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From Lemma A.2.1 and Lemma A.2.2, bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, 2(p − θ)]
choose p∗o(p, r) = p − θ to which the seller responds with the counter-offer
p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) = ∆t−1(y). Bargainers with even higher reservation price (i.e.,
2(p − θ) < r < b) choose p∗o(p, r) = min[p, r2 ] to which the seller responds
with the counter-offer p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = max[min[r, p], ∆t−1(y)]. As a result,
bargainers with reservation prices between ∆t−1(y) and p end up buying at their
reservation price and bargainers with r > p will buy at the original posted price











Substituting these into equation (2.6), the expected revenue-to-go function for
a given posted price p, Jt(p, y) is














Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− p
b
+ λ(1− q)b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
.
Note that both terms are positive for p < θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
, thus Jt(p, y) is increasing




• Case 2b: θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
≤ p < 2θ
Similar to Case 2a, bargainers with r ∈ [p− θ, 2(p− θ)] choose p∗o(p, r) = p− θ
and bargainers with 2(p − θ) < r < b choose p∗o(p, r) = min[p, r2 ]. Applying
Lemma A.2.2, the seller’s counter-offers are p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) = p − θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
to those with p∗o(p, r) = p − θ and p∗ct(p, p∗o(p, r), y) = min[r, p] to those with
p∗o(p, r) > p− θ.
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As a result, bargainers with r ∈ [p− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
, 2(p− θ)] buy at p− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
,
bargainers with r ∈ (2(p− θ), p] buy at their reservation price, and bargainers
with even higher reservation price buy at the original posted price p. Thus:
Kt(p, y) =
p− θ − ∆t−1(y)
2
b
(p− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
) +











Substituting these into equation (2.6), Jt(p, y) and J
′
t(p, y) are























J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− 3p + 2θ + ∆t−1(y)
b
+ λ(1− q)b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
.
Note that both terms of J ′t(p, y) are decreasing in p and positive at p = 2θ
(since b − 4θ + ∆t−1(y) > 0 by assumption.) Thus, Jt(p, y) is increasing in p
between [θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
, 2θ).
• Case 2c: 2θ ≤ p < b
2
+ θ
From Lemma A.2.1, bargainers with r ∈ [p−θ, 2(p−θ)] choose p∗o(p, r) = p−θ
and bargainers with even higher reservation price (i.e., p ≤ 2(p − θ) < r < b)
choose p∗o(p, r) = min[p,
r
2
]. Facing these offers, the seller responds with the
counter-offer p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) = p − θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
to those with p∗o(p, r) = p − θ
and p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = p to those with p
∗
o(p, r) > p− θ. As a result, bargainers
with r ∈ [p − θ + ∆t−1(y)
2




r > 2(p− θ) will buy at the original posted price p. Thus:
Kt(p, y) =
p− θ − ∆t−1(y)
2
b











Substituting these into equation (2.6), the expected revenue-to-go function for
a given posted price p, Jt(p, y) is






(p− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2












Since J ′′t (p, y) = −(2λ/b) < 0, Jt(p, y) is concave. Furthermore, Taking the
derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y)|p=2θ = λ
b− 4θ + ∆t−1(y)
b
≥ 0, and










• Case 2d: b
2
+ θ ≤ p ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ
From the fact that 2(p − θ) ≥ b and Lemma A.2.1, all bargainers with r ∈
[p − θ, b] choose p∗o(p, r) = p − θ, to which the seller responds with a uni-
lateral counter-offer p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) =
b+∆t−1(y)
2
(from Lemma A.2.2). Thus,
bargainers with r ≥ b+∆t−1(y)
2
buy at price b+∆t−1(y)
2











Substituting these into equation (2.6), Jt(p, y) and J
′(p, y) are













= Vt−1(y) + λq
(b−∆t−1(y))2
4b
+ λ(1− q)b− p
b
[p−∆t−1(y)]
J ′t(p, y) = λ(1− q)
b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
< 0 for all p ≥ b
2
+ θ.
Thus Jt(p, y) is decreasing in p from p =
b
2
+ θ to p = b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ.
• Case 2e: b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ < p ≤ b
If the posted price increases even further, all bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, b]
choose p∗o(p, r) = p − θ by Lemma A.2.1. Applying Lemma A.2.2, the seller
accepts the buyer’s offer (i.e., p∗ct(p, p− θ, y) = p− θ). As a result, bargainers
with reservation price greater than p− θ will buy at price p− θ. Thus, we have
Kt(p, y) =
b− p + θ
b
(p− θ) and Bt(p, y) =
b− p + θ
b
.
Substituting these into equation (2.6), we have
Jt(p, y) = Vt−1(y) + λq
[
b− p + θ
b







Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe for all p > b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ
J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− 2(p− θ) + ∆t−1(y)
b
+ λ(1− q)b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
< 0.















< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q)
Once again, we consider five sub-cases depending on the value of p: 3a) ∆t−1(y) ≤ p <
θ+ ∆t−1(y)
2
, 3b) θ+ ∆t−1(y)
2









+ θ < p ≤ b.
• Case 3a: ∆t−1(y) ≤ p < θ + ∆t−1(y)2





• Case 3b: θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
≤ p < 2θ
For a given p, the bargainers’s offer and the seller’s counter-offer are identical
to those in Case 2b. Thus, we have
Kt(p, y) =
p− θ − ∆t−1(y)
2
b
(p− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
) +











Substituting these into equation (2.6), the expected revenue-to-go function for
a given posted price p, Jt(p, y) is























Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− 3p + 2θ + ∆t−1(y)
b




Note that Jt(p, y) is concave in p and the solution to the first order condition
is p∗ = b+2qθ+∆t−1(y)
2+q
. The feasibility of p∗ comes from the facts
p∗ − θ − ∆t−1(y)
2
=
2b− q∆t−1(y)− 2θ(2− q)
2(2 + q)
≥ 0 since θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) ,
p∗ − 2θ = b + ∆t−1(y)− 4θ
2 + q
< 0 since θ > b+∆t−1(y)
4
.




• Case 3c: 2θ ≤ p < b
2
+ θ
For a given p, the bargainers’s offer and the seller’s counter-offer are identical














Substituting these into equation (2.6), the expected revenue-to-go function for
a given posted price p, Jt(p, y) is





















Taking the derivative with respect to p, we observe
J ′t(p, y) = λ
b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
.
If p ≥ 2θ, then p > b+∆t−1(y)
2
, then J ′t(p, y) < 0. Hence, Jt(p, y) is decreasing in
p between [2θ, b
2
+ θ).
• Case 3d: b
2




This case is identical to Case 2d. Applying identical algebra, it is easy to see




• Case 3e: b+∆t−1(y)
2
+ θ < p ≤ b
This case is identical to Case 2e, thus Jt(p, y) is decreasing in p ∈ ( b+∆t−1(y)2 , b].








Case 4: θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q)
We divide into sub-cases depending on the value of p: 4a) ∆t−1(y) ≤ p < θ + ∆t−1(y)2
and 4b) θ + ∆t−1(y)
2
≤ p ≤ b.
• Case 4a: ∆t−1(y) ≤ p < θ + ∆t−1(y)2
From Lemma A.2.1, bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, 2(p − θ)] choose p∗o(p, r) =
p − θ to which the seller responds with the counter-offer p∗ct(p, p − θ, y) =
∆t−1(y). Bargainers with even higher reservation price (i.e., 2(p − θ) < r <
b) choose p∗o(p, r) = min[p,
r
2
] to which the seller responds with the counter-
offer p∗ct(p, p
∗
o(p, r), y) = max[min[r, p], ∆t−1(y)]. As a result, bargainers with
reservation price between ∆t−1(y) and p end up buying at their reservation
price and bargainers with r > p will buy at the original posted price p. This
case is identical to Case 2a. Thus, we have














J ′t(p, y) = λq
b− p
b




Note that Jt(p, y) is concave in p and the solution to the first order condition
is p∗ = b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)
2−q . The feasibility of p










− θ < 0.
Thus, Jt(p, y) is maximized at p
∗ = b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)
2−q .
• Case 4b: θ+ ∆t−1(y)
2
≤ p ≤ b For a given p, the bargainers’s offer and the seller’s
counter-offer are identical to those in Case 2b. Thus, we have























J ′t(y, p) = λq
b− 3p + 2θ + ∆t−1(y)
b
+ λ(1− q)b− 2p + ∆t−1(y)
b
.







b− θ − ∆t−1(y)
2
b










where the inequality comes from θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) . Since J
′
t(y, p) is decreasing p,
we conclude that Jt(y, p) is decreasing in p for p ≥ θ + ∆t−1(y)2 .
Combining two cases, it is easy to see that Jt(y, p) is increasing in p up to p =
b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)






Proof of Lemma 2.4.2
Note that, the optimal posted price described in Lemma 2.4.1, p∗t (y) is always greater
than or equal to b
2
. It is easy to see that p∗t (y) ≥ b2 for the first and third cases of










4qθ + 2∆t−1(y)− bq
2(2 + q)
.
Since θ > b+∆t−1(y)
4
, it follows that p∗t (y) ≥ b2 . Therefore, for any r ∈ [0, b], we have
r ≤ 2p∗t (y). The result now follows by letting p = p∗t (y) in Lemma A.2.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3
We consider four cases as in the proof of Lemma 2.4.1.
Case 1: θ ≤ ∆t−1(y)
2
In this case, the optimal posted price p∗t (y) =
b+∆t−1(y)
2
by Lemma 2.4.1(a). Using
simple algebra, it is easy to check 2(p∗t (y) − θ) ≥ b. Thus, from Lemma 2.4.2,
all bargainers with r ≥ p∗t (y) − θ offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y) − θ. To this offer,




t (y) − θ, y) = p∗t (y) by letting






< θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
:
The optimal posted price is again p∗t (y) =
b+∆t−1(y)
2
by Lemma 2.4.1(a). We first note
that p∗t (y) ≤ 2(p∗t (y) − θ) < b where the first inequality comes from θ ≤
b+∆t−1(y)
4
and the second inequality from ∆t−1(y)
2
< θ. Hence, by Lemma 2.4.2, bargainers
with r ∈ [p∗t (y) − θ, 2(p∗t (y) − θ)] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y) − θ and bargainers with
r ∈ (2(p∗t (y)− θ), b] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = r2 .
To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗
t (y), r) =
p∗t (y) − θ, we let p∗t (y) =
b+∆t−1(y)
2














− θ + ∆t−1(y)
2









t (y)− θ, y)
= max
{









To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗




note that these offers are made by bargainers with r ≥ 2(p∗t (y)− θ). Also note that,
in this case, 2(p∗t (y)− θ) ≥ p∗t (y). Thus, from Lemma A.2.2
p∗ct(p
∗
t (y), r/2, y) = max {min{r, p∗t (y)}, ∆t−1(y)} = p∗t (y).
Case 3: b+∆t−1(y)
4
< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) :
The optimal posted price is p∗t (y) =
b+2qθ+∆t−1(y)
2+q
by Lemma 2.4.1(b). We first
note that 2(p∗t (y)−θ) < p∗t (y) < b where the first inequality comes from θ >
b+∆t−1(y)
4
and the second inequality from Lemma A.2.3. Hence, by Lemma 2.4.2, bargainers
with r ∈ [p∗t (y) − θ, 2(p∗t (y) − θ)] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y) − θ and bargainers with
r ∈ (2(p∗t (y)− θ), b] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = r2 .
To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗
t (y), r) =
p∗t (y)− θ, we let p∗t (y) =
b+2qθ+∆t−1(y)
2+q
in Lemma A.2.2 and note that θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q)
implies that
∆t−1(y) ≤ p∗t (y)− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2







t (y)− θ, y)
= max
{









To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗




we first note that these offers are from bargainers with r such that r ≥ 2(p∗t (y)− θ).
Furthermore, in this case, ∆t−1(y) ≤ 2(p∗t (y) − θ) as shown above. Hence, from
Lemma A.2.2, we have
p∗ct(p
∗
t (y), r/2, y) = max {min{r, p∗t (y)}, ∆t−1(y)} =

r if r < p∗t (y);
p∗t (y) if r ≥ p∗t (y).
Case 4: θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) :
The optimal posted price is p∗t (y) =
b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)
2−q by Lemma 2.4.1(c). We first





and the second inequality from Lemma A.2.3. Hence, by Lemma
2.4.2, bargainers with r ∈ [p∗t (y)− θ, 2(p∗t (y)− θ)] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = p∗t (y)− θ and
bargainers with r ∈ (2(p∗t (y)− θ), b] offer p∗o(p∗t (y), r) = r2 .
To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗
t (y), r) =
p∗t (y)− θ, we let p∗t (y) =
b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)














t (y)− θ, y)
= max
{






To determine the seller’s optimal counter-offer to bargainers with p∗o(p
∗




we first note that these offers are from bargainers with r such that r ≥ 2(p∗t (y)− θ).
However, in this case, 2(p∗t (y) − θ) < ∆t−1(y) as shown above. As a result, the
seller responds with the counter-offer p∗ct(p
∗
t (y), r/2, y) = ∆t−1(y) if r < ∆t−1(y), and
p∗ct(p
∗
t (y), r/2, y) = min[r, p
∗
t (y)] if r ≥ ∆t−1(y). Hence, from Lemma A.2.2, we have
p∗ct(p
∗
t (y), r/2, y)
= max {min{r, p∗t (y)}, ∆t−1(y)} =

∆t−1(y) if r < ∆t−1(y);
r if ∆t−1(y) ≤ r < p∗t (y);
p∗t (y) if r ≥ p∗t (y).
Lemma A.2.1. Under Assumption 3, given arbitrary posted price p, the optimal
offer of a bargainer with reservation price r given is
p∗o(p, r) =

p− θ if p− θ ≤ r ≤ 2(p− θ);
r
2
if 2(p− θ) < r ≤ 2p;
p if r > 2p.
(A.7)
Proof of Lemma A.2.1




. Applying this to equation (2.3), we obtain ρ(x) = 2x. The result
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now follows from Lemma 2.3.2.
Lemma A.2.2. Let p∗ct(p, po, y) denote the optimal counter-offer when the seller has
y units of inventory in period t given a customer offer po in response to an arbitrary
posted price p ≥ ∆t−1(y). Then:









if po = p− θ and 2(p− θ) > b;
max
{





if po = p− θ and 2(p− θ) ≤ b;
max {min{2po, p}, ∆t−1(y)} if po > p− θ.
Proof of Lemma A.2.2
Throughout the proof, recall that ρ(x) = 2x under Assumption 3. If po > p− θ, the
result follows from Lemma 2.3.5. Consider the case where po = p − θ. Then, under










Vt−1(y) if pc ≤ 2(p− θ);
0 if pc > 2(p− θ).
We divide into two cases, (i) 2(p− θ) > b, and (ii) 2(p− θ) ≤ b.




defined as arg max{Zt(pc, y)|p−θ ≤ pc ≤ min[p, ρ(p−θ)]}, is given by min{p, max{p−
θ, b+∆t−1(y)
2
}}. (To verify this claim, recall that Zt(pc, y) is unimodal in pc by Lemma
2.3.4 and note that b ≥ ∆t−1(y) by Lemma A.2.3(b).) This observation along with
Lemma 2.3.5 yields
p∗ct(p, po, y) = max
{










pct(y) = min{p, 2(p− θ), p− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
}. This along with Lemma 2.3.5 yields
p∗ct(p, po, y) = max
{





Lemma A.2.3. Let p∗t (y) denote the optimal posted price when the firm has y units
of inventory in period t and F (·) is uniform over [0, b]. Then:
(a) p∗t (y) ≤ b.
(b) ∆t−1(y) ≤ b for any t and y.
Proof of Lemma A.2.3
Suppose p > b in period t with y units in inventory. We will show that setting the
posted price to b will not worsen the seller’s expected revenue-to-go, which allows us
to conclude that p∗t (y) ≤ b.
Consider first the case where p ∈ (b, b + θ]. When p ∈ (b, b + θ], no price-taker
will buy and, thus, the seller’s expected revenue in period t from a price-taker is
zero. From Lemmas A.2.1 and A.2.2, bargainers with r ∈ [p − θ, min[2(p − θ), b]]
make an offer of p− θ and receive a counter-offer equal to some p̂c where p̂c ≥ p− θ;
bargainers with r ∈ [min[2(p − θ), b], b] (if such an interval exists) make an offer of
r/2 and receive a counter-offer of r. Therefore, Jt(p, y) is given by
Jt(p, y) = Vt−1(y) + λq [Kt(p, y)−Bt(p, y)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))]










−F (p̂c)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))
]
.
Suppose now we set the posted price to b. No price-taker will buy and, thus,
the seller’s expected revenue in period t from a price-taker is zero. Once again,
from Lemma A.2.1, bargainers with r ∈ [b − θ, min[2(b − θ), b]] make an offer of
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b − θ and bargainers with r ∈ [min[2(b − θ), b], b] (if such an interval exists) make
an offer of r/2. Suppose the seller is using the following counter-offer strategy,
which is not necessarily optimal: All bargainers who offer b − θ receive a counter-
offer of p̂c; all bargainers with r ∈ [min[2(b − θ), b], min[2(p − θ), b]] also receive
a counter-offer of p̂c; bargainers with r ∈ [min[2(p − θ), b], b] (if such an interval
exists) receive a counter-offer of r. Note that under this counter-offer strategy, no
bargainers with r ∈ [b− θ, p− θ) will buy as p̂c ≥ p− θ. As a result, bargainers with
r ∈ [p̂c, min[2(p−θ), b]] will buy at p̂c and bargainers with r ∈ [min[2(p−θ), b], b] buy
at r. Let J̃t(b, y) denote the expected revenue-to-go of a seller using this counter-offer
strategy under posted price b. Then,
J̃t(b, y) = Vt−1(y)
+λq
[









−F (p̂c)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))
]
= Jt(p, y).
Since the counter-offer strategy resulting in J̃t(b, y) is not necessarily optimal, we
have Jt(b, y) ≥ J̃t(b, y) = Jt(p, y). Thus, the seller can do at least as well with the
posted price b as it does with the posted price p.
Now consider the case when p > b + θ. In this case, neither a bargainer nor a
price-taker will buy the product in period t. Thus, Jt(p, y) = Vt−1(y). Using a logic
similar to the previous case, it can be shown that Jt(b, y) ≥ Jt(p, y); the seller can
do at least as well with posted price b as it does with posted price b..
Finally, part (b) follows from Lemma 2.3.3 and part (a) of the lemma; ∆t−1(y) ≤
p∗t (y) ≤ b.
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A.3 Proofs of Propositions 2.4.1 through 2.4.3, and Corol-
lary 2.4.1 in Section 2.4
Here, we prove Propositions 2.4.1 through 2.4.3 and Corollary 2.4.1 in Section
2.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1




We next compare pTLt (y) with p
∗
t (y) given by Lemma 2.4.1.
(i)If θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
, then p∗t (y) = p
TL
t (y) by Lemma 2.4.1(a).
(ii)If b+∆t−1(y)
4
< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , then, from Lemma 2.4.1(b), we have
p∗t (y)− pTLt (y) =
b + 2qθ + ∆t−1(y)
2 + q






where the inequality follows from the condition θ > b+∆t−1(y)
4
. Furthermore,
p∗t (y)− pTLt (y)− θ =
2qθ − bq − q∆t−1(y)− 4θ
2(2 + q)
≤ 0.
Hence, pTLt (y) < p
∗
t (y) ≤ pTLt (y) + θ.
(iii)If θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , then, from Lemma 2.4.1(c), we have
p∗t (y)− pTLt (y) =
b + (1− q)∆t−1(y)
2− q






where the inequality follows from the fact that b ≥ ∆t−1(y). Furthermore,
p∗t (y)− pTLt (y)− θ =
−q∆t−1(y) + bq
2(2− q)
− θ ≤ 0
where the inequality follows from the condition that θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) . Hence, p
TL
t (y) <
p∗t (y) ≤ pTLt (y) + θ.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Consider a policy where the seller uses a take-it-or-leave-it price p in period t with
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y units of inventory and follows the optimal negotiation policy from period t − 1
onward. We define the expected revenue of the seller using such policy as follows:
J̃t(p, y) = λF (p)p + λF (p)Vt−1(y − 1) + (1− λF (p))Vt−1(y).
Note that V TLt (y) = maxp J̃t(p, y). Notice that J̃t(p, y) can be rewritten as
J̃t(p, y) = Vt−1(y) + λq[pF̄ (p)− F̄ (p)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))]
+λ(1− q)[pF̄ (p)− F̄ (p)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))]
Thus, J̃t(p, y) is also the expected revenue of a seller who sets a posted price p in
period t with y units of inventory and whose counter-offer to any bargainer’s offer
in period t is simply the posted price p itself. This counter-offer is one of many
counter-offers that the seller can choose whereas Kt(p, y) and Bt(p, y) correspond to
the optimal counter-offer strategy for a given posted price p, thus
Jt(p, y)− J̃t(p, y) = λq[Kt(p, y)−Bt(p, y)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))]
−λq[pF̄ (p)− F̄ (p)(Vt−1(y)− Vt−1(y − 1))] ≥ 0.
Therefore, from the definitions of p∗t (y) (the optimal posted price under negotiation)




t (y), y) ≥ Jt(pTLt (y), y) ≥ J̃t(pTLt (y), y) = V TLt (y).
Proof of Corollary 2.4.1
For the purposes of this proof, define V Rt (y), the optimal expected revenue of the
seller using take-it-or-leave-it pricing throughout the remaining t periods, i.e.,
V Rt (y) = max
p
{
λF (p)p + λF (p)V Rt−1(y − 1) + (1− λF (p))V Rt−1(y)
}
,
y > 0, t = 1, . . . , T
V R0 (y) = 0 for y ≥ 0, and V Rt (0) = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T
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We would like to prove that Vt(y) ≥ V Rt (y). The proof is by induction on t. The
result holds trivially when t = 0. Suppose Vk(y) ≥ V Rk (y), k ≤ t for some t ≥ 0. We
will prove that Vt+1(y) ≥ V Rt+1(y). We first rearrange terms in Vt+1(y):
Vt+1(y) = Vt(y) + max
p

λq [Kt+1(p, y)−Bt+1(p, y)(Vt(y)− Vt(y − 1))]

























qKt+1(p, y) + (1− q)F (p)p
)
+λV Rt (y − 1)
[




1− λ(qBt+1(p, y) + (1− q)F (p))
]










p− (V Rt (y)− V Rt (y − 1))
]

Note that Kt(p, y) and Bt(p, y) correspond to the optimal counter-offer strategy for
given posted price p, thus the resultant expected revenue to go function is greater
than or equal to the revenue under the policy where the seller’s counter-offer is set
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to the posted price p regardless of the bargainer’s offer. Hence,













Proof of Proposition 2.4.3
Note that price-takers are not better-off since pTLt (y) ≤ p∗t (y) ≤ pTLt (y) + θ by
Proposition 2.4.1. Hence, we focus on the bargainers and compare the price that a




(i) If θ ≤ ∆t−1(y)
2
, then p∗t (y) = p
TL
t (y). Note that by Lemmas 2.4.2 and 2.4.3,




< θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
, then p∗t (y) = p
TL
t (y). By Lemmas 2.4.2 and 2.4.3,
bargainers with r > 2(p∗t (y) − θ) pay p∗t (y) ≥ pTLt (y) and thus are not better off;
bargainers with r ∈ [p∗t (y) − θ +
∆t−1(y)
2




pTLt (y) − θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
< pTLt (y) since θ >
∆t−1(y)
2
. Therefore, bargainers with r ∈
[p∗t (y)− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
, 2(p∗t (y)− θ)] are better off.
(iii) If b+∆t−1(y)
4
< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)





. By Lemmas 2.4.2
and 2.4.3, bargainers with r > p∗t (y) pay p
∗
t (y) ≥ pTLt (y) and thus are not better off;
bargainers with r ∈ (2(p∗t (y) − θ), p∗t (y)] pay r, and are not better off; bargainers
with r ∈ [p∗t (y)− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2




p∗t (y)− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
− pTLt (y) =
2qθ + 2∆t−1(y)− 4θ − bq
2(2 + q)
< 0




. Hence, bargainers with
r ∈ [p∗t (y)− θ +
∆t−1(y)
2
, 2(p∗t (y)− θ)] are better off.
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(iv) If θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)




2−q . By Lemmas 2.4.2 and 2.4.3,
bargainers with r > p∗t (y) pay p
∗
t (y) ≥ pTLt (y), and thus are not better off; bargainers
with r ∈ [∆t−1(y), p∗t (y)] pay r, and thus are not better off.
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A.4 Proofs of Propositions 2.4.4 through 2.4.6 in Section 2.4
Here, we prove Propositions 2.4.4 through 2.4.6 in Section 2.4. The proof of
Proposition 2.4.6 utilizes Lemma A.4.1, which is stated and proven at the end of
Appendix A.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.4
In order to prove that p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in θ, we first use Lemma 2.4.1 and the
following equalities to note that p∗t (y) is continuous in θ.

















b + 2qθ + ∆t−1(y)
2 + q
.
Now, note from Lemma 2.4.1 that p∗t (y) is constant with respect to θ when θ ≤
b+∆t−1(y)
4
, increasing in θ when θ ∈ ( b+∆t−1(y)
4
, 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) ] and constant with respect
to θ when θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) . Hence, p
∗
t (y) is non-decreasing in θ.
In order to prove that p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in q, we consider two cases:
Case 1: θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
: Note from Lemma 2.4.1 that if θ ≤ b+∆t−1(y)
4
, then p∗t (y) is
constant with respect to q and the result holds trivially.
Case 2: θ > b+∆t−1(y)
4
: First, note that θ < 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) if and only if q >
4θ−2b
2θ−∆t−1(y) .









if q > 4θ−2b
2θ−∆t−1(y) .







2−q ). Furthermore, it is easy to check
that b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)
2−q is non-decreasing in q (by taking the derivative with respect to
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q and noting that b ≥ ∆t−1(y) by Lemma A.2.3(b)). Similarly, one can check
that b+2qθ+∆t−1(y)
2+q
is non-decreasing in q (by taking the derivative and noting that
θ > b+∆t−1(y)
4
). Hence, p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5
We first prove the result for θ. From the proof of Lemma 2.4.1, it can be verified
that the optimal expected revenue-to-go Vt(y) = Jt(p
∗
t (y), y) depends on θ and takes
one of the following four forms.









































































































For each of the four cases, we substitute the corresponding p∗t (y) from Lemma




















) ≥ 0 for b+∆t−1(y)
4
< θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) ;
0 for θ > 2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) .
(A.8)
where the first and second inequalities follow from ∆t−1(y)
2




t (y), y) is non-decreasing in each of the four regions
above. Finally, by substituting the values of θ at the boundaries of the four cases
above, it can be shown that Jt(p
∗
t (y), y) is continuous in θ. Hence, Jt(p
∗
t (y), y) is
non-decreasing in θ.
The result that Jt(p
∗
t (y), y) is non-decreasing in q can be shown following a similar
logic, thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.6
We first prove that p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y). We then use this fact and
Lemma A.4.1 to conclude the proof. Throughout the proof, recall that ∆t−1(y) ∈




< θ ≤ b




Case 1: θ ≤ b
4




for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b] by Lemma 2.4.1(a). It now follows that p∗t (y)
is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y).
Case 2: θ > b
2−q : In this case, for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b], we have θ >
2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) .
Hence, p∗t (y) =
b+(1−q)∆t−1(y)
2−q for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b] by Lemma 2.4.1(c). It follows
that p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y).
Case 3: b
4
< θ ≤ b








This, along with the facts that b+∆t−1(y)
4
is increasing in ∆t−1(y) and
2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) is




2(2−q) for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b].
Now, consider two cases:
Case 3(a) θ ≥ b
2





2(2−q) . Hence, for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0,
2b−2(2−q)θ
q




Lemma 2.4.1(b), and non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y) over that interval. In addition,
for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ (2b−2(2−q)θq , b], we have θ >
2b−q∆t−1(y)
2(2−q) , which implies, by Lemma




t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y) over that inter-
val. Furthermore, one can check from Lemma 2.4.1(b), (c) that p∗t (y) is continuous
in ∆t−1(y) at ∆t−1(y) =
2b−2(2−q)θ
q
. Therefore, p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y)
over the interval ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b].
Case 3(b) θ < b
2
: In this case, for all ∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, 4θ − b), we have b+∆t−1(y)4 <
θ ≤ 2b−q∆t−1(y)






Lemma 2.4.1(b), and non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y) over that interval. In addition, for




and p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y) over that interval. Further-
more, one can check from Lemma 2.4.1(a), (b) that p∗t (y) is continuous in ∆t−1(y)
at ∆t−1(y) = 4θ − b. Therefore, p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y) over the interval
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∆t−1(y) ∈ [0, b].
Now that we have proven that p∗t (y) is non-decreasing in ∆t−1(y), we conclude
the proof by noting that ∆t−1(y) is non-increasing in y and non-decreasing in t by
Lemma A.4.1.
Lemma A.4.1. The function Vt(y) has the following three properties:
H1(t, y) : Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt+1(y) ≥ Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y), y ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T.
H2(t, y) : Vt+1(y)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt+2(y)− Vt+1(y), y ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T.
H3(t, y) : Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt(y + 2)− Vt(y + 1), y ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T.
Proof of Lemma A.4.1
Following Bitran and Mondschein (1993), we prove the result by induction on t + y.
The three inequalities hold when t + y = 0. Suppose they hold for t + y = m − 1.
We prove they hold when t + y = m to complete the induction.
(i) H1(t, y) : Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt+1(y) ≥ Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y).






t+1(y), y) + Bt+1(p
∗












1− λqBt+1(p∗t+1(y), y)− λ(1− q)F (p∗t+1(y))
]
Vt(y)









t+1(y), y) + λ(1− q)F (p∗t+1(y))
]








t+1(y + 1), y + 1) + Bt+1(p
∗




p∗t+1(y + 1)F (p
∗






1− λqBt+1(p∗t+1(y + 1), y + 1)− λ(1− q)F (p∗t+1(y + 1))
]
Vt(y + 1).
Now, we note that a seller with y + 1 units in inventory at period t + 1 could set
its posted price to the optimal posted price of a seller with y units in inventory at
period t + 1, i.e., p∗t+1(y), which is suboptimal. Also, note that a bargainer’s offer
remains the same as long as the posted price remains the same. Therefore, if a seller
with y +1 units in inventory at period t+1 is using posted price p∗t+1(y), then it can
also mimic the counter-offer strategy of a seller with y units in inventory at period
t + 1. Of course, doing so is suboptimal for the seller with y + 1 units in inventory
at period t + 1. Therefore:


















1− λqBt+1(p∗t+1(y), y)− λ(1− q)F (p∗t+1(y))
]
Vt(y + 1)
Subtracting Vt(y + 1) from both sides of the above inequality, we obtain
Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt(y + 1)





t+1(y), y) + λ(1− q)F (p∗t+1(y))
]
(Vt(y)− Vt(y + 1)) .
(A.10)
From induction hypothesis H3(t, y − 1), we have
Vt(y)− Vt(y + 1) ≥ Vt(y − 1)− Vt(y). (A.11)
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Thus, from equations (A.9)– (A.11), we have
H1(t, y) : Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt(y + 1) ≥ Vt+1(y)− Vt(y).
(ii) H2(t, y) : Vt+1(y)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt+2(y)− Vt+1(y).





t+2(y), y) + Bt+2(p
∗












1− λqBt+2(p∗t+2(y), y)− λ(1− q)F (p∗t+2(y))
]
Vt+1(y)









t+2(y), y) + λ(1− q)F (p∗t+2(y))
]
(Vt+1(y − 1)− Vt+1(y)) .
(A.12)
Now, we note that a seller with y units in inventory at period t + 1 could mimic the
optimal posted price and counter-offer strategy of the seller with y units in inventory
at period t + 2. Of course, doing so is suboptimal for the seller with with y units in





t+2(y), y) + Bt+2(p
∗
















Subtracting Vt(y) from both sides, we get
Vt+1(y)− Vt(y)





t+2(y), y) + λ(1− q)F (p∗t+2(y))
]
(Vt(y − 1)− Vt(y)) .
(A.13)
From induction hypothesis H1(t, y − 1), we have
Vt(y − 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt+1(y − 1)− Vt+1(y). (A.14)
Thus, from equations (A.12)– (A.14), we have
H2(t, y) : Vt+1(y)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt+2(y)− Vt+1(y).
(iii) H3(t, y) : Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt(y + 2)− Vt(y + 1).
Using arguments similar to those in parts (i) and (ii), we obtain
Vt(y + 2)− Vt−1(y + 1)
= λqKt(p
∗
t (y + 2), y + 2) + λ(1− q)p∗t (y + 2)F (p∗t (y + 2))
+
[
1− λqBt(p∗t (y + 2), y + 2)− λ(1− q)F (p∗t (y + 2))
]
×
(Vt−1(y + 2)− Vt−1(y + 1)) . (A.15)
and
Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt(y)
≥ λqKt(p∗t (y + 2), y + 2) + λ(1− q)p∗t (y + 2)F (p∗t (y + 2))
+
[
1−λqBt(p∗t (y + 2), y + 2)−λ(1− q)F (p∗t (y + 2))
]
×
(Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y)) . (A.16)
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From H1(t− 1, y) and H3(t− 1, y), we have
Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt−1(y + 1)− Vt−1(y) ≥ Vt−1(y + 2)− Vt−1(y + 1). (A.17)
Therefore, from equations (A.15) – (A.17), we obtain
Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt(y + 2)− Vt−1(y + 1). (A.18)
From H2(t− 1, y + 1), we have
Vt(y + 1)− Vt−1(y + 1) ≥ Vt+1(y + 1)− Vt(y + 1). (A.19)
Finally, adding (A.18) and (A.19), we obtain
H3(t, y) : Vt(y + 1)− Vt(y) ≥ Vt(y + 2)− Vt(y + 1).
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions in Section 3.4
In this appendix, we prove the results stated in Section 3.4. The proofs utilize
Lemmas B.1.1 and B.1.2, stated and proven at the end of Appendix B.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
Proof of (a): We prove the unimodality of Πu
RP







≥ 0, (2) ∂
2ΠuRP(p,w)
∂p2




= 0, and (3)
Πu
RP
(p, w) → 0 as p →∞.
First note that the first and second partial derivatives of Πu
RP










= −2af(p)− a(p− w)f ′(p). (B.2)
Claim (1) follows from (B.1) while claim (3) follows from F (p) → 0 as p → ∞. To















Since F is IFR, f ′(·)F (·)+f 2(·) ≥ 0. Hence, claim (2) follows from (B.3), concluding
the proof of unimodality of Πu
RP
(p, w) in p.
Proof of (b): From part (a), pu(w) satisfies F (pu(w))− (pu(w)− w)f(pu(w)) = 0.
Implicit differentiation of this equality with respect to w yields
(2f(pu(w)) + (pu(w)− w)f ′(pu(w))) dp
u(w)
dw
− f(pu(w)) = 0. (B.4)
Substituting pu(w)− w = F (w)
f(w)





2f 2(pu(w)) + f ′(pu(w))F (pu(w))
. (B.5)
Since F is IFR, we have f ′(·)F (·) + f 2(·) ≥ 0, which implies dp
u(w)
dw
> 0. Thus, pu(w)
strictly increases in w.
To prove pu(w) is convex in w, we show d
2pu(w)
dw2
≥ 0. Take the second derivative
























Proof of (c): We prove the unimodality of Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)) = a(w− c)F (pu(w)) in w

















0, and (3) Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)) → 0 as w →∞.
First note that the first and second partial derivatives of Πu
MP





























Claim (1) follows from (B.6) while claim (3) follows from F (pu(w)) → 0 as w and













































Since F is IFR, we have f ′(·)F (·)+ f 2(·) ≥ 0 and the term in the bracket is positive.
Since pu(w) increases in w and d
2pu(w)
dw2
≥ 0 from part (b), all three terms are negative
with the second term being strictly negative and ,thus, claim (2) follows, concluding
the proof of unimodality of Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)) in w.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.2
Proof of (a): We prove the unimodality of Πu
RN
(qmin, w) = a
∫ ∞
qmin
[(1 − β)x +













= 0, and (3) Πu
RN
(qmin, w) → 0 as qmin →∞.
First note that the first and second partial derivatives of Πu
RN










= −a(1 + β)f(qmin) + a(−qmin + w + cr + cb)f ′(qmin).(B.10)
Claim (1) follows from (B.9) while claim (3) follows from F (qmin) → 0 as qmin →∞.
















Since F is IFR, f ′(·)F (·)+f 2(·) ≥ 0. Hence claim (2) follows from (B.11), concluding
the proof of unimodality of Πu
RN
(qmin, w) in qmin.
Proof of (b): From part (a), qumin(w) satisfies (−qumin(w) + w + cr + cb)f(qumin(w)) +
βF (qumin(w)) = 0. Implicit differentiation of this equality with respect to w yields




Substituting (−qumin(w) + w + cr + cb) =
−βF (qumin(w))
f(qumin(w))















qumin(w) strictly increases in w.
To prove qumin(w) is convex in w, we show
d2qumin(w)
dw2
≥ 0. Take the second derivative



























Proof of (c): We prove the unimodality of Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)) = a(w − c)F (qumin(w))

















= 0, and (3) Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)) → 0 as w →∞.
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First note that the first and second partial derivatives of Πu
MN



























Claim (1) follows from (B.13) while claim (3) follows from F (qumin(w)) → 0 as w, and




















































Since F is IFR, f ′(·)F (·) + f 2(·) ≥ 0 and the term in the bracket is positive. Since
qumin(w) increases in w and
d2qumin(w)
dw2
> 0 from part (b), all three terms are negative
with the second term being strictly negative and, thus, claim (2) follows, concluding
the proof of unimodality of Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)) in w.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.3
Let qumin(w, cr, cb) and w
u
N
(cr, cb) be the optimal cut-off valuation and the optimal


























b). Also by substituting (B.12) into (B.13), we notice that the optimal
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(pu(w), w) − Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w). We apply Lemma B.1.1 to
prove the proposition. From Lemma B.1.1(a)(b), if ∆u
R
(w) does not change sign,
then one of two cases must be true:
(1) ∆u
R
(w) < 0 for all w ≥ c and the retailer prefers negotiation and chooses
qumin(w) regardless of w (corresponding to part (b) of the proposition), or
(2) ∆u
R
(w) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ c and the retailer (weakly) prefers posted pricing and
chooses pu(w) regardless of w (corresponding to part (a) of the proposition).
On the other hand, if ∆u
R









(w) < 0 for w < ŵu
R
(retailer uses negotiation and chooses qumin(w)),
and ∆u
R
(w) > 0 for w > ŵu
R
(retailer uses posted pricing and chooses pu(w)), which
corresponds to part (c) of the proposition.





























(w) changes sign at w = ŵu
R
. Then, from Lemma B.1.1(c), there










(w) ≥ 0 for w ≥
ŵu
M
. That is, Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)) ≥ ΠuMP(w, pu(w)) for w ≤ ŵuM and ΠuMN(w, qumin(w)) ≤
Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)) for w ≥ ŵu
M





Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
First, observe from (3.14) that when the retailer chooses negotiation at all whole-
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Likewise, from (3.13), we observe that when the retailer chooses posted pricing at all
wholesale prices w ≥ c, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is given by wu
P
,
the maximizer of Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)), and the retailer picks the price pu(wu
P
).
We now focus on the case where there exists ŵu
R
such that the retailer chooses
negotiation when w ≤ ŵu
R
and posted pricing when w > ŵu
R

























With these definitions, observe that the manufacturer’s problem of choosing the
wholesale price, given by (3.15), reduces to picking the wholesale price wo
N
if GN ≥ GP
or the wholesale price wo
P
if GN < GP. Consider two cases: (1) GN ≥ GP and (2)
GN < GP.
(1) GN ≥ GP
The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is wo
N
. Lemma B.1.2(a) shows that the
maximizer wo
N




}. At wholesale price wo
N
, the retailer will
choose negotiation. This case corresponds to parts (a) and (b) of the proposition.
(2) GN < GP









. In such a case, since Πu
MP



























)) ≤ GN, where the first inequality is by Proposition 3.4.2 and the
second comes from the definition of GN. Hence, GP ≤ GN, which is a contradiction
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to the assumption that GN < GP.




, it follows from the unimodality of Πu
MP
(w, pu(w))




(hence, sup can be replaced by max). At wholesale price wu
P
, the
retailer chooses posted pricing. This corresponds to part (c) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4
We first show the existence of cT. If cT = 0, notice from (3.12) that negotiation
is better for the retailer regardless of the wholesale price. On the other hand, if
cT > Er[r] (the total cost of negotiation is larger than the expected valuation), it
can be shown from (3.12) that posted pricing is better for the retailer regardless of
the wholesale price. Thus, at any given wholesale price, the retailer’s sales format
choice switches from negotiation to posted pricing at least once as cT changes from
0 to Er[r], and cT exists.
Next, we will prove that if the equilibrium sales format is posted pricing at a
given cT, then the equilibrium sales format is still posted pricing at higher cT. If this
result holds, once the equilibrium sales format becomes posted pricing, it will never
switch back to negotiation as cT increases. We will then conclude that there exists
a unique cT such that the equilibrium sales format is negotiation for cT ∈ [0, cT) and
posted pricing for cT ≥ cT.
Suppose posted pricing is chosen in equilibrium at a given cT = c
o
T
. It must be
that the equilibrium wholesale price is wu
P
(from Proposition 3.4.3(c)). We will divide




. The two cases are:
(1) there exists ŵu
R
> c, and (2) there does not exist ŵu
R
and the retailer chooses










(w, qumin(w)) and w
o
N









(w, pu(w)) and wo
P





With these definitions, the manufacturer’s problem, given by (3.15), results in the
optimal wholesale price wo
N
(cT) if GN(cT) ≥ GP(cT) or the optimal wholesale price
wo
P
(cT) if GN(cT) < GP(cT). Since the equilibrium sales format is posted pricing at
co
T










for some arbitrarily small δ > 0. First, note from Lemma B.1.2(b) that ŵu
R
decreases
in cT. Therefore, the feasible region of the optimization problem that determines




is constant with respect to cT. Therefore, GP is the optimal value of an objective




+ δ) ≥ GP(coT).








+ δ) ≤ GN(coT) < GP(coT) ≤ GP(coT + δ),






In this case, at co
T
, the retailer is choosing posted pricing for any w ≥ c, that is,
Πu
RP
(pu(w), w) ≥ Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ c. We observe that ΠuRP(pu(w), w) is
constant with respect to cT and Π
u
RN




we continue to have Πu
RP
(pu(w), w) ≥ Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ c, and the retailer will
choose posted pricing no matter what the wholesale price is.
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Combining cases (1) and (2), we conclude that if the equilibrium sales format is
posted pricing at a given cT, then the equilibrium sales format is still posted pricing
at higher cT. Hence, there exists a unique cT such that the equilibrium sales format
is negotiation for cT ∈ [0, cT) and posted pricing for cT ≥ cT.
It remains to show that cT exists and separates the regions where the equilibrium




. We know from the preceding discussion that there
exists cT such that negotiation is the equilibrium for cT ∈ [0, cT) and posted pricing
is the equilibrium for cT ≥ cT. Let us now focus on the region cT ∈ [0, cT). For any cT
in this region, we know from Proposition 3.4.3 that the equilibrium wholesale price




. Consider two cases:
(1) There does not exist cT ∈ [0, cT) such that the equilibrium wholesale price is ŵuR
In this case, it must be that the equilibrium wholesale price is wu
N
for any cT ∈ [0, cT),
in which case we have cT = cT.
(2)There exists c̃T ∈ [0, cT) such that the equilibrium wholesale price is ŵuR at c̃T
From Lemma B.1.2(d), for any cT ∈ [c̃T, cT), the manufacturer would choose ŵuR.
Hence, there exists cT, given by the lowest such c̃T, and the equilibrium wholesale
price is ŵu
R
for any cT ∈ [cT, cT).
Lemma B.1.1. Given the wholesale price w, let ∆u
R
(w) be the difference between







(qumin(w), w), and ∆
u
M
(w) be the difference between the manufac-










(c) ≥ 0, then ∆u
R




(c) < 0, then either:
(i) ∆u
R
(w) < 0 for all w ≥ c and ∆u
R
(w) is strictly increasing in w, or
(ii) ∆u
R
(w) is strictly unimodal and changes sign once. If ∆u
R
(w) changes sign,














(w) changes sign at w = ŵu
R
















(pu(w), w) and Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) are convex decreasing in w.
Proof of Lemma B.1.1
Proofs of (a) and (b): We prove the result by showing (1) ∆u
R








= 0. Claim (2) implies that if a stationary
point exists, it must be a maximum. The claim (2) thus implies that there exists
at most one maximizer. (otherwise, there must be a minimizer between two local
maxima, which contradicts the claim that all stationary points are local maxima.) If
claims (1) and (2) hold, the behavior of the function ∆u
R
(w) must follow either part

















Figure B.1: The figure illustrates the possibilities discussed in parts (a) and (b) of
Lemma B.1.1.
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We now prove claims (1) and (2) hold. From the facts that pu(w) → ∞ and
qumin(w) → ∞ as w → ∞, it can be shown that ΠuRP(pu(w), w) and ΠuRN(qumin(w), w)
both approach zero as w → ∞. Hence, as w → ∞, ∆u
R
(w) approaches zero, which
proves (1).









































= −aF (pu(w)) + aF (qumin(w)). (B.18)




= 0. Thus, at w̃, we have −aF (pu(w̃)) =






















where the inequality follows from the facts that pu(w̃) = qumin(w̃), F is IFR and
0 < β < 1.

























where the inequality is from pu(w̃) = qumin(w̃) and (B.19). Hence, (2) is proven, which
concludes the proof of part (a) and (b).
Proof of (c): Our first goal is to prove that if ∆u
R
(w) changes sign, then ∆u
M
(w)







(w, qumin(w)) = a(w−c)F (pu(w))−a(w−c)F (qumin(w)).






. Therefore, it suffices to
show that if ∆u
R




changes sign exactly once by crossing
zero from above. Suppose now ∆u
R
(w) changes sign. From the discussion in parts (a)
and (b), we know that we must be in case (ii) of part (b): ∆u
R
(w) crosses zero from








is positive for w ≤ w̃ and negative for w ≥ w̃. It now follows that ∆u
M
(w) changes
sign exactly once, and the point where it changes sign, ŵu
M
, is given by w̃ such that
d∆uR(w̃)
dw
= 0. Furthermore, observe from Figure B.1 that, in case (ii) of part (b), the
point at which ∆u
R
(w) changes sign, ŵu
R
, must come before ŵu
M
= w̃.






















Since both pu(w) and qumin(w) increase in w (by Lemma 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively),
both Πu
RP
(pu(w), w) and Πu
RN
(qumin(w), w) are convex in w.
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Lemma B.1.2. Let ∆u
R
(w) be the difference between the retailer’s optimal profits un-















(w) ≥ 0 for w ≥ ŵu
R
.








(cT) denote the optimal solution to (B.20) and GN(cT) be the optimal value of
the objective function for a given cT. Then:
(a) wo
N
(cT) = min{ŵuR, wuN}.
(b) ŵu
R




























(e) GN(cT) decreases in cT.
Proof of Lemma B.1.2
Proof of (a): Recall that wu
N
is the unconstrained maximizer of Πu
MN
(w, qumin(w)).




(w, qumin(w)) is unimodal in w (by Lemma





























(cT), cT)− ΠuRP(pu(ŵuR(cT)), ŵuR(cT)) = 0. (B.21)
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Note that the first and fourth terms of (B.22) are zero, since qumin and p
u satisfy the
first-order conditions of Πu
RN
(qmin, w, cT) and Π
u
RP
(p, w), respectively. Also, recall that
Πu
RN
(qmin, w, cT) = a
∫ ∞
qmin
[(1− β)x + βqmin − w − cT] f(x)dx,
Πu
RP
(p, w) = a(p− w)F (p).








































(cT), cT))− F (pu(ŵuR(cT)))
.




< −1, it suffices to show F (qumin(ŵuR(cT), cT)) > F (pu(ŵuR(cT))).
Since ∆u
R
(w) is changing sign at w = ŵu
R
(cT), it follows from Lemma B.1.1(a) that
∆u
R
(w) must be strictly increasing in w at w = ŵu
R
(cT). (See (iv) of Figure B.1.)
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Using this fact, we obtain from (B.18) that F (qumin(ŵ
u
R




which concludes the proof of (b).
Proof of (c): In preparation for the proof, we will first derive a few useful ex-
pressions. First, substituting the expression for
dqumin(w)
dw
, given by (B.12), into the
manufacturer’s first-order condition, (B.13), and recalling that wu
N
is the solution to
















(1 + β)f 2(qumin(w
u
N









Let φ(x) := f
2(x)
(1+β)f2(x)+βf ′(x)F (x)




βf(x)[f ′(x)(2f ′(x)F (x) + f 2(x))− f ′′(x)f(x)F (x)]
[(1 + β)f 2(x) + βf ′(x)F (x)]2
. (B.24)
We observe from (B.24) that φ(x) increases in x (since the numerator is non-negative











− c)φ(qumin(wuN)) = 0. (B.25)
Now we are ready to prove the result. Here, to make explicit the dependence on
cT, we write w
u
N
(cT) instead of w
u
N
. In addition, for notational convenience, we write











(cT)− c)φ(qumin(cT)) = 0. (B.26)







≤ 0, that is, when cT increases, qumin(cT) and
wu
N
(cT) cannot both strictly increase or strictly decrease. We prove this by contra-
diction.
131
Suppose now both qumin(cT) and w
u
N




decreases (because F is IFR). Furthermore, φ(qumin(cT))
increases (because φ(x) is increasing in x, as observed earlier). Hence, the left-hand
side of (B.26) is strictly decreasing in cT, which yields a contradiction since (B.26)
must hold as an equality for any cT.
Next, suppose that both qumin(cT) and w
u
N
(cT) strictly decrease in cT. Once again,




increases (because F is IFR). Furthermore, φ(qumin(cT)) decreases (be-
cause φ(x) is increasing in x, as observed earlier). Hence, the left-hand side of (B.26)
is strictly increasing in cT, which again yields a contradiction since (B.26) must hold
as an equality for any cT.







≤ 0. Next, we will utilize this result




≤ 0. Implicit differentiation of the retailer’s first-order




















where the term in the brackets is positive, because F is IFR and, hence, f ′(·)F (·) +




















≥ 0. It now follows that
dwuN(cT)
dcT


















concludes the proof of part (c).
Proof of (d): From part (a), we have wo
N
(cT) = min{ŵuR, wuN}. Hence, if woN(coT) = ŵuR,














. Hence, if cT increases, ŵ
u
R



















) ≥ GN(c′T). In this proof, we













(w, qmin), to make the dependence on cT explicit. It is not difficult to
check that Πu
MN




































Furthermore, note that when cT = c
o
T




) is a feasible solution for the
optimization problem in (B.20). To see why, note that ŵu
R













), which is feasible for the problem in
(B.20) when cT = c
′
T












































B.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions in Section 3.5
In this appendix, we prove the results stated in Section 3.5. The proofs uti-
lize Lemmas B.2.1 through B.2.3 and Propositions B.2.1 through B.2.3, stated and
proven at the end of Appendix B.2.
Proofs of Lemmas 3.5.1 and 3.5.2
Notice from (3.18) that the maximizer of ΠMP(w, p
∗(w, Q), Q), denoted by w∗
P
(Q),
cannot be strictly less than wP(Q) (since ΠMP(w, p
∗(w, Q), Q) is linearly increasing
in w for w ∈ [c, wP(Q)]). Now, for w ≥ wP(Q), ΠMP(w, p∗(w,Q), Q) is equal to
Πu
MP
(w, pu(w)), which itself is unimodal and peaks at wu
P
by Lemma 3.4.1. There-
fore, w∗
P
(Q) is given by wu
P
or wP(Q), whichever is larger. The same line of arguments
proves Lemma 3.5.2 as well.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
We omit the proof of this proposition. The proof is almost identical to that of





in the earlier proof
with q∗min(w, Q) = max{qumin(w), p̄(Q)}, p∗(w,Q) = max{pu(w), p̄(Q)}, w∗N(Q) =
max{wN(Q), wuN} and w∗P(Q) = max{wP(Q), wuP} here.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
The proof proceeds in two parts, the first part showing the existence of Q and
the second part showing the existence of Q.
Part 1: The existence of Q
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We first show that if the equilibrium sales format is negotiation at a given Q, then
the equilibrium sales format is still negotiation for a larger Q. This allows us to
conclude that if the equilibrium sales format is negotiation at some Q ≥ 0, then the
smallest such Q yields Q. Otherwise, if the equilibrium sales format is posted pricing
for all Q < ∞, then Q = ∞.
Suppose that negotiation is the equilibrium sales format at Qo. Necessarily, the
equilibrium wholesale price must be the solution to either problem (3.23) or problem
(3.24) defined in Section 3.5. We consider two cases separately.
Suppose that the equilibrium wholesale price is the solution to problem (3.23) at




∗(w, Qo), w,Qo)− ΠRN(q∗min(w,Qo), w,Qo) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ c.
For any Q > Qo, we show that the retailer will continue to prefer negotiation for all
w ≥ c, that is, ∆R(w,Q) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ c. If this is true, the equilibrium sales format
is also negotiation at Q > Qo. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there
exists Q > Qo and w′ ≥ c such that ∆R(w′, Q) > 0. Recall from Proposition B.2.1
that if the retailer prefers posted pricing at some wholesale price w′, it continues to
prefer posted pricing at a higher wholesale price. Furthermore, note that the sales
quantity under both formats decrease and converge to zero as w increases. Hence,
there must exist a w′′ ≥ w′ such that ∆R(w′′, Q) > 0 and both formats sell strictly less
than Qo. However, notice that at the wholesale price w′′, quantities sold under both
formats will be less than Qo for any Q ≥ Qo. Therefore, ∆R(w′′, Qo) = ∆R(w′′, Q) >
0. This contradicts the fact that ∆R(w,Q
o) ≤ 0 for all w ≥ c.
Now suppose that the equilibrium wholesale price is the solution to problem
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(3.24) at capacity Qo. For the sake of exposition, we temporarily define the following


















min(w, Q), Q) and
wo
P




Since the equilibrium sales format is negotiation at Qo, it must be that GN(Q
o) ≥
GP(Q
o). We first note that, for a capacity Q′ such that Q′ > Qo, the equilibrium
wholesale price is the solution to problem (3.24) at capacity Q′. To see why this is
true, note from Lemma B.2.3(b) that ŵR(Q) is increasing in Q. Therefore, if there
exists a ŵR(Q) > c for Q = Q
o (that is, if there exists a feasible wholesale price below
which the retailer strictly prefers negotiation and above which the retailer strictly
prefers posted pricing), then there must exist a ŵR(Q) > c for Q = Q
′ as well. We
will conclude the proof by showing that for Q′ > Qo, we have GN(Q
′) ≥ GP(Q′),
which implies that the equilibrium sales format will be negotiation at capacity Q′.
We next state and prove a claim that will help us complete the proof:





(Q), ŵR(Q)} = max{wuP, ŵR(Q)}




, wP(Q)} is the maximizer
of ΠMP(w, p
∗(w, Q), Q). Observe from (3.18) that ΠMP(w, p
∗(w, Q), Q) is unimodal
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second equality follows directly if there does not exist a wP(Q) ≥ c (i.e., there
does not exist a feasible wholesale price at which posted pricing is constrained by




in that case. If there exists a wP(Q) ≥ c, then



















Since ŵR(Q) is increasing in Q (by Lemma B.2.3(b)) and w
u
P
does not depend on











o). On the other hand, GN(Q) increases in Q by
Lemma B.2.3(d). Therefore, given that GN(Q
o) ≥ GP(Qo) (since negotiation is the
equilibrium at capacity Qo),
GN(Q







′) ≥ ΠMN(ŵR(Q′), q∗min(ŵR(Q′), Q′), Q′)
≥ ΠMP(ŵR(Q′), p∗(ŵR(Q′), Q′), Q′) = GP(Q′).
where the first inequality is by definition of GN(Q) and the second inequality is by
Proposition B.2.2.
1To see why, note from (3.18) that ΠMP(w, p∗(w,Q), Q) = (w − c)Q for w ≤ wP(Q) and
ΠMP(w, p∗(w,Q), Q) = ΠuMP(w, p
u(w)) for w ≥ wP(Q), and ΠuMP(w, pu(w)) itself is unimodal as
shown in Lemma 3.4.1(c).
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Cases (1) and (2) together conclude that GN(Q
′) ≥ GP(Q′), which concludes Part
1.
Part 2: The existence of Q
Suppose now Q < ∞ so that there exists a range of capacities at which nego-
tiation is the equilibrium. We now show that Q exists and separates the regions
where the equilibrium wholesale price is w∗
N
(Q) versus ŵR(Q). Let us now focus on
the region Q ≥ Q. For any Q in this region, we know from Proposition 3.5.1 that
the equilibrium wholesale price must be either ŵR(Q) or w
∗
N
(Q). Note that if there
exists Q̃ ≥ Q such that the equilibrium wholesale price is w∗
N
(Q) at Q̃, then from
Lemma B.2.3(c), the manufacturer would choose w∗
N
(Q) for any Q > Q̃. Hence,
there exists Q, given by the smallest such Q̃, and the equilibrium wholesale price is
w∗
N
(Q) for any Q ≥ Q. We observe that it is possible that Q = Q, in which case
the equilibrium wholesale price is never ŵR(Q). On the other hand, if there does not
exist Q ≥ Q such that the equilibrium wholesale price is w∗
N
(Q), then it must be that
the equilibrium wholesale price is ŵR(Q) for any Q ≥ Q.
Lemma B.2.1. For a given wholesale price w and capacity Q, let ∆R(w, Q) be the
difference between the retailer’s optimal profits under posted pricing and negotiation,
that is, ∆R(w, Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w,Q), w,Q)− ΠRN(q∗min(w, Q), w, Q). Then,
(a) If ∆R(c, Q) ≥ 0, then ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ c
(b) If ∆R(c, Q) < 0, then either:
(i) ∆R(w, Q) < 0 for all w ≥ c, or
(ii) There exists a unique ŵR(Q) such that ∆R(w, Q) < 0 for w < ŵR(Q)
and ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for w ≥ ŵR(Q). In other words, ∆R(w, Q) crosses zero only
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once at ŵR(Q) > c.
(c) For a given Q, suppose that there exists wP(Q) ≥ c but there does not exists
wN(Q) ≥ c. Then, ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ c.
(d) For a given Q, suppose that there exist wP(Q) ≥ c, wN(Q) ≥ c, ŵR(Q) > c. It
must be that wN(Q) > wP(Q) and ŵR(Q) > wP(Q).
Proof of Lemma B.2.1
In this proof, we omit Q whenever the dependence is obvious. For example, we
write p∗(w) instead of p∗(w, Q) and q∗min(w) instead of q
∗
min(w,Q).
Proofs of (a) and (b): We consider four cases depending on whether there exist
wN(Q) ≥ c and/or wP(Q) ≥ c, that is, whether there exists a feasible wholesale price
(i.e. greater than or equal to c) at which the quantity sold under negotiation and/or
posted pricing is not bounded by capacity. These four cases are: (1) neither wN(Q)
nor wP(Q) exists, (2) both wN(Q) and wP(Q) exist, (3) only wP(Q) exists, and (4)
only wN(Q) exists.
Case (1) In case (1), the retailer and manufacturer’s profits are never bounded by
capacity. Hence, the problem collapses to the uncapacitated one, for which
Lemma B.1.1(a)(b) shows the desired result.
Case (2) We will divide the proof of case (2) into three mutually exclusive subcases:
(2.a) wP ≥ wN, (2.b) wP < wN and ∆R(wP(Q), Q) ≥ 0, and (2.c) wP < wN and
∆R(wP(Q), Q) < 0. As we will prove next, in subcases (2.a) and (2.b), part (a)
of this lemma holds. In subcase (2.c), part (b) of this lemma holds.
(2.a) wP ≥ wN
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Since wP ≥ wN ≥ c, applying equations (3.17) and (3.20), we have
∆R(w, Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w), w)− ΠRN(q∗min(w), w)
=

ΠRP(p̄, w)− ΠRN(p̄, w) for w ∈ [c, wN],





(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ wP.
(B.30)
From the definitions of wN, wP and p̄, it can be shown that ∆R(w, Q) is contin-
uous and differentiable in w. To help with the proof, we substitute from (3.17)





0 for w ∈ [c, wN],
−Q + aF (qumin(w)) for w ∈ [wN, wP],
−aF (pu(w)) + aF (qumin(w)) for w ≥ wP.
(B.31)
Notice that aF (qumin(w)) ≤ Q for w ∈ [wN, wP] (since qumin(w) ≥ qumin(wN) =
p̄(Q) for w ≥ wN). Therefore, we observe from (B.31) that d∆R(w,Q)dw ≤ 0 for
w ∈ [c, wP].
First, we show that ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for any w ∈ [c, wP]. We prove this by
contradiction. Suppose there exists some wo ≤ wP such that ∆R(wo, Q) < 0.
Since d∆R(w,Q)
dw
≤ 0 for w ∈ [c, wP], it must be that ∆R(wP, Q) < 0. Notice from
(B.30) that, for w ≥ wP, capacity is no longer binding and the retailer’s profits
under both sales formats are given by the profits in the uncapacitated problem:
∆R(w, Q) = ∆
u
R
(w) for w ≥ wP. Combining the facts above, we must have
∆u
R














However, this contradicts Lemma B.1.1(b) as the function ∆u
R
(w) cannot be
(weakly) decreasing at a w where it is strictly negative. Therefore, ∆R(w, Q) ≥
0 for any w ∈ [c, wP].
It remains to show that ∆R(w,Q) ≥ 0 for w > wP. Recall that for w ≥ wP,
∆R(w, Q) = ∆
u
R
(w) and we have shown above that ∆u
R
(wP) ≥ 0. Lemma
B.1.1(a) and (b) together imply that once ∆u
R
(w) is positive for some w, ∆u
R
(w)
remains positive for any larger w. Therefore, ∆R(w, Q) = ∆
u
R
(w) ≥ 0 for
w > wP.
(2.b) wP < wN and ∆R(wP, Q) ≥ 0
Since wP < wN, applying equations (3.17) and (3.20), we have
∆R(w, Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w), w)− ΠRN(q∗min(w), w)
=

ΠRP(p̄, w)− ΠRN(p̄, w) for w ∈ [c, wP],
Πu
RP





(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ wN.
(B.32)
From the definitions of wN, wP and p̄, it can be shown that ∆R(w, Q) is dif-
ferentiable in w. To help with the proof, we substitute from (3.17) and (3.20)





0 for w ∈ [c, wP],
−aF (pu(w)) + Q for w ∈ [wP, wN],
−aF (pu(w)) + aF (qumin(w)) for w ≥ wN.
(B.33)
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First, observe from (B.33) that d∆R(w,Q)
dw
= 0 for w ∈ [c, wP]. Hence, given our
assumption that ∆R(wP, Q) ≥ 0, it follows that ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for w ∈ [c, wP].
Second, notice that aF (pu(w)) ≤ Q for w ∈ [wP, wN] (since pu(w) ≥ pu(wP) =
p̄(Q) for w ≥ wP). Therefore, we observe from (B.33) that d∆R(w,Q)dw ≥ 0 for
w ∈ [c, wN]. Since ∆R(wP, Q) ≥ 0 by assumption, it follows that ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0
for all w ∈ [c, wN].
It remains to show that ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for w > wN. Notice from (B.32) that
for w ≥ wN, ∆R(w, Q) = ∆uR(w). We have shown above that ∆uR(wN) ≥ 0.
Lemma B.1.1(a) and (b) together imply that once ∆u
R
(w) is positive for some
w, ∆u
R




for w > wN.
(2.c) wP < wN and ∆R(wP, Q) < 0
Since wP < wN, ∆R(w, Q) and
d∆R(w,Q)
dw
are given by (B.32) and (B.33), respec-
tively. Observe that d∆R(w,Q)
dw
= 0 for w ∈ [c, wP]. Hence, given our assumption
that ∆R(wP, Q) < 0, it must be that ∆R(w,Q) < 0 for w ∈ [c, wP]. Next,
we consider the behavior of ∆R(w, Q) for w > wP by examining two subcases:
(2.c.i) ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0, and (2.c.ii) ∆R(wN, Q) < 0.
(2.c.i) ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0
For w ∈ (wP, wN], observe from (B.33) that d∆R(w,Q)dw > 0 (since p
u(w) >
pu(wP) = p̄(Q) for w > wP). Combining this observation with the facts that
∆R(wP, Q) < 0 and ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0, it must be that ∆R(w, Q) crosses zero only
once for some w ∈ (wP, wN].
As for w ≥ wN, observe from (B.32) that ∆R(w,Q) = ∆uR(w) when w ≥ wN.
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By Lemma B.1.1(a) and (b) together, once ∆u
R
(w) crosses zero at some w,
it stays strictly positive for larger w. Therefore, given our assumption that
∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0, it follows that ∆R(w,Q) = ∆uR(w) ≥ 0 for w ≥ wN.
(2.c.ii) ∆R(wN, Q) < 0
Recall that d∆R(w,Q)
dw
= 0 for w ∈ [c, wP] and d∆R(w,Q)dw ≥ 0 for w ∈ [wP, wN] from
(B.33). Therefore, given the assumption that ∆R(wN, Q) < 0, it must be that
∆R(w, Q) < 0 for w ∈ [c, wN].
For w ≥ wN, recall that ∆R(w,Q) = ∆uR(w). Since ∆R(wN, Q) = ∆uR(wN) < 0,
the behavior of ∆R(w, Q) = ∆
u
R
(w) must follow the case in Lemma B.1.1(b) for
w ≥ wN.
Case (3) Consider now the case where wP ≥ c exists, but wN ≥ c does not exist.
The quantity sold under negotiation is not bounded by capacity for any w ≥ c.
Hence, ΠRN(q
∗
min(w), w) = Π
u
RN
(qumin(w), w) for all w ≥ c. Given this fact and
applying equation (3.17), we have
∆R(w,Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w), w)− ΠRN(q∗min(w), w)
=






(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ wP.
(B.34)
Notice that (B.34) is a special case of (B.30). Therefore, case (3) collapses to
case (2.a), and ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ c.
Case (4) Consider now the case where wN ≥ c exists, but wP ≥ c does not exist.
The quantity sold under posted pricing is not bounded by capacity for any
w ≥ c. Hence, ΠRP(p∗(w), w) = ΠuRP(pu(w), w) for all w ≥ c. Given this fact
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and applying equation (3.17), we have
∆R(w,Q) = ΠRP(p










(qumin(w), w) for w ≥ wN.
(B.35)
Depending on whether ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0 or ∆R(wN, Q) < 0, the result is the same
as in case (2.c.i) or (2.c.ii), respectively.
Proof of (c): The result follows immediately from the discussion of case (3) above,
as that discussion shows that ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for all w ≥ c when only wP ≥ c exists.
Proof of (d): If wN ≥ c and wP ≥ c both exist, the only case where ŵR exists is
case (2.c) discussed in the proof of parts (a) and (b): wP < wN and ∆R(wP, Q) < 0.
In the proof of case (2.c), we have shown that ∆R(w, Q) < 0 for w ∈ [c, wP]. Hence,
the wholesale price at which ∆R(w, Q) = 0 must be strictly greater than wP, that is,
ŵR > wP.
Lemma B.2.2. Define ∆R(w,Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w, Q), w, Q) − ΠRN(q∗min(w, Q), w, Q).
Suppose there exists a unique ŵR(Q) such that ∆R(w,Q) < 0 for w < ŵR(Q) and








(cT) denote the optimal solution to (B.36) and GN(cT) be the optimal value of
the objective function for a given cT. Then,
(a) wo
N
(cT) = min{ŵR(Q), w∗N(Q)}.




















(e) GN(cT) decreases in cT.
Proof of Lemma B.2.2
The proof of Lemma B.2.2 is similar to that of Lemma B.1.2 and mostly algebraic,
therefore omitted.
Lemma B.2.3.




(b) Define ∆R(w,Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w, Q), w,Q) − ΠRN(q∗min(w, Q), w,Q). Suppose there
exists a unique ŵR(Q) such that ∆R(w, Q) < 0 for w < ŵR(Q) and ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for
w ≥ ŵR(Q). Then, dŵR(Q)dQ ≥ 0.








(Q) denote the optimal solution to (B.37) and GN(Q) be the optimal value of
the objective function for a given Q. Then,










(d) GN(Q) increases in Q.
Proof of Lemma B.2.3
Proof of (a): For a given capacity Q, the market-clearing wholesale price under
negotiation, wN(Q), is defined so that even a retailer with unlimited capacity will find
it optimal to sell exactly Q units. In other words, qumin(wN(Q)) = p̄(Q) (see (3.19)
and the preceding discussion). Hence, qumin(wN(Q)) and wN(Q) satisfy the first-order
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condition of the retailer’s profit function under negotiation, Πu
RN

















= a(−qumin(w) + w + cT)f(qumin(w)) + aβF (qumin(w)) = 0.
Substituting w = wN(Q) and q
u
min(wN(Q)) = p̄(Q) in the above equation, we obtain
the following identity:
(
−p̄(Q) + wN(Q) + cT
)
f(p̄(Q)) + βF (p̄(Q)) = 0, or,
−βF (p̄(Q))
f(p̄(Q))
+ p̄(Q) = wN(Q) + cT. (B.38)
When Q increases, p̄(Q) decreases (since aF (p̄(Q)) = Q) and, thus, β F (p̄(Q))
f(p̄(Q))
increases
due to F being IFR. Therefore, the left-hand side of the above identity decreases in
Q. Hence, wN(Q) must decrease in Q.
Proof of (b): We consider four cases depending on whether there exist wN(Q) ≥ c
and/or wP(Q) ≥ c, that is whether there exists a feasible wholesale price (i.e. greater
than or equal to c) at which the quantity sold under negotiation and/or posted pricing
is not bounded by capacity. Four cases are: (1) both wN(Q) and wP(Q) exist, (2)
only wN(Q) exists, (3) only wP(Q) exists, and (4) neither of them exists.
(1) both wP(Q) and wN(Q) exist
Note from Lemma B.2.1(d) that if ŵR(Q) exists, it must be that wP(Q) <
min{ŵR(Q), wN(Q)}. Therefore, there are two possible subcases: (1.a) wP(Q) <
ŵR(Q) < wN(Q), and (1.b) wP(Q) < wN(Q) ≤ ŵR(Q).
Consider the first subcase (1.a). By definition, ŵR(Q) satisfies ∆R(ŵR(Q), Q) = 0.
Observe from (3.17) and (3.20) that
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ΠRP(p
∗(ŵR(Q), Q), ŵR(Q), Q) = Π
u
RP
(pu(ŵR(Q)), ŵR(Q)) (since wP(Q) < ŵR(Q)), and
ΠRN(q
∗
min(ŵR(Q), Q), ŵR(Q), Q) = ΠRN(p̄(Q), ŵR(Q), Q) (since ŵR(Q) < wN(Q)).
Therefore, at w = ŵR(Q), the following identity must be satisfied:
ΠRN(p̄(Q), ŵR(Q), Q)− ΠuRP(pu(ŵR(Q)), ŵR(Q)) = 0.



































Note that the third term on the right-hand side of (B.39) is zero since pu satisfies
the first-order condition of Πu
RP
(p, w). Recall that
ΠRN(qmin, w,Q) = a
∫ ∞
qmin
[(1− β)x + βqmin − w − cT]f(x)dx,
Πu
RP
(p, w) = a(p− w)F (p).
Take the partial derivatives of these functions, we obtain
∂ΠRN(qmin, w,Q)
∂qmin
= a(−qmin + w + cT)f(qmin) + aβF (qmin),
∂ΠRN(qmin, w,Q)
∂w

















−p̄(Q) + ŵR(Q) + cT
)








f(p̄(Q))+βF (p̄(Q)) = 0. Since ŵR(Q) <
wN(Q) in subcase (1.a), it follows that(
−p̄(Q) + ŵR(Q) + cT
)
f(p̄(Q)) + βF (p̄(Q)) < 0.
Furthermore, dp̄(Q)
dQ
< 0 since p̄(Q) is such that aF (p̄(Q)) = Q. Hence, the right-
hand side of (B.40) is positive. We then consider the left-hand side of (B.40). Note
that, since wP(Q) < ŵR(Q) in subcase (1.a), it follows that p
u(ŵR(Q)) > p
u(wP(Q)) =









Since the right-hand side of (B.40) is positive, we now conclude dŵR(Q)
dQ
≥ 0.
Subcase (1.b) can be proven similarly by implicit differentiation of the same
identity.
(2) only wN(Q) exists
We consider two separate subcases: (2.a) ŵR(Q) < wN(Q) and (2.b) wN(Q) ≤
ŵR(Q). Note that the analysis of (2.a) is similar to case (1.a), and (2.b) is similar to
case (1.b).
(3) only wP(Q) exists
Note that if wP(Q) exists and wN(Q) does not exist, Lemma B.2.1(c) shows that
ŵR(Q) does not exist. Therefore, this case cannot occur when there exists ŵR(Q) at
given Q.
(4) both wP(Q) and wN(Q) do not exist
The analysis is similar to case (1.b).
Proof of (c): Pick two capacity levels Qo and Q′ such that Qo < Q′. We consider
three cases depending on whether there exists a feasible wholesale price at which the
quantity sold under negotiation will be capacity-constrained at each capacity level,
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Qo and Q′: (1) both wN(Q
o) ≥ c and wN(Q′) ≥ c exist, (2) neither of them exists,
and (3) wN(Q
o) ≥ c exists, but wN(Q′) ≥ c does not exist. (The case that wN(Qo) ≥ c
does not exist and wN(Q
′) ≥ c exists cannot occur since wN(Q) decreases in Q, which
is proven in part (a) of this lemma.)
(1) wN(Q
o) ≥ c and wN(Q′) ≥ c
Note from Lemma B.2.2(a) that wo
N
(Q) = min{ŵR(Q), w∗N(Q)} and from Lemma
3.5.2 that w∗
N
(Q) = max{wN(Q), wuN}. Therefore, given that woN(Qo) = w∗N(Qo), it
must be that ŵR(Q
o) ≥ max{wN(Qo), wuN}. Observe that wuN is constant with respect
to Q and, from part (a) of this lemma, wN(Q) decreases when Q increases. Also
observe from part (b) of this lemma, ŵR(Q) increases as Q increases. Therefore,
ŵR(Q






(2) neither of them exists
In this case, there does not exist a feasible wholesale price at which the quantity









. It follows that
wo
N
(Qo) = min{ŵR(Qo), wuN} and woN(Q′) = min{ŵR(Q′), wuN}.
Then, the result follows from the facts that wu
N
is constant with respect to Q,
ŵR(Q
′) ≥ ŵR(Qo) (from part (b) of this lemma) and woN(Qo) = wuN.
(3) only wN(Q
o) ≥ c exists




. The result follows from the following set of inequalities:
ŵR(Q
′) ≥ ŵR(Qo) ≥ max{wN(Qo), wuN} ≥ wuN
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where the first inequality comes from part (b) of this lemma and the second inequal-




(Qo) = max{wN(Qo), wuN}.
Proof of (d): It is easy to check that ΠMN(w, q
∗
min(w,Q), Q) increases in Q. There-









≤ ΠMN(woN(Qo), q∗min(woN(Qo), Q′), Q′). (B.41)
Furthermore, since ŵR(Q) increases in Q, w
o
N
(Qo) must be feasible for the optimiza-









≥ ΠMN(woN(Qo), q∗min(woN(Qo), Q′), Q′). (B.42)
Combining (B.41) and (B.42), we obtain GN(Q
′) ≥ GN(Qo).
Proposition B.2.1. [Retailer’s best response]
(a) If the retailer (weakly) prefers posted pricing at w = c, then the retailer strictly
prefers posted pricing for all w > c.
Otherwise (i.e., if the retailer strictly prefers negotiation at w = c):
(b) either the retailer strictly prefers negotiation at all w > c,
(c) or there exists a unique threshold ŵR(Q) > c such that the retailer is indifferent
between negotiation and posted pricing if w = ŵR(Q), strictly prefers negotiation if
w < ŵR(Q), and strictly prefers posted pricing if w > ŵR(Q).
Proof of Proposition B.2.1
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Define ∆R(w, Q) = ΠRP(p
∗(w, Q), w, Q) − ΠRN(q∗min(w,Q), w,Q) to be the differ-
ence between the retailer’s optimal profits under the two sales formats at a given
wholesale price, w. Lemma B.2.1(a)(b) proves that either (1) ∆R(w, Q) ≥ 0 for all
w ≥ c, or (2) ∆R(w, Q) < 0 for all w ≥ c ,or (3) if ∆R(w,Q) crosses zero for some
w, it does so only once and from below. These three possibilities correspond to the
three possible best response patterns listed in the proposition.
Proposition B.2.2. Suppose there exists ŵR(Q) > c that makes the retailer indif-
ferent between negotiation and posted pricing, as described in Proposition B.2.1(c).
At the wholesale price ŵR(Q), the manufacturer prefers negotiation. In other words,
ΠMN(ŵR(Q), q
∗
min(ŵR(Q), Q), Q) ≥ ΠMP(ŵR(Q), p∗(ŵR(Q), Q), Q).
Proof of Proposition B.2.2
For ease of exposition, we prove the results when there exist market-clearing
wholesale prices, wP(Q) ≥ c and wN(Q) ≥ c for a given Q. Notice that if neither
wP(Q) ≥ c nor wN(Q) ≥ c exists, then there would be no feasible wholesale price
(w ≥ c) that makes the capacity binding under either sales format and, hence, the
problem reverts to the unlimited capacity version, for which the result has already
been established in Section 3.4. If only one of wP(Q) ≥ c or wN(Q) ≥ c exists, then
there would be no feasible wholesale price that makes capacity binding under one of
the sales formats, and the result would follow as a special case of the proof we are
providing here.
For this proof, we omit Q whenever the dependence is obvious. Define ∆M(w,Q) =
ΠMP(w, p
∗(w)) − ΠMN(w, q∗min(w)) to be the difference between the manufacturer’s
profits under the two sales formats, and define ŵM be such that ∆M(w,Q) ≤ 0 for
151
w ≤ ŵM and ∆M(w, Q) ≥ 0 for w ≥ ŵM. Lemma B.2.1(d) shows that, if ŵR exists, it
must be that wN > wP and ŵR > wP. Since wN > wP, applying equations (3.18) and
(3.21), we have




0 for w ∈ [c, wP],
a(w − c)F (pu(w))− (w − c)Q ≤ 0 for w ∈ [wP, wN],
a(w − c)F (pu(w))− a(w − c)F (qumin(w)) for w ≥ wN.
(B.43)
Notice from above that ∆M(w, Q) ≤ 0 for w ≤ wN. We next analyze the behavior
of ∆M(w, Q) for w > wN. Observe that the sales quantity under neither format will
be bounded by the capacity if w ≥ wN. Since capacity Q plays no role under both
sales formats when w ≥ wN, ∆M(w, Q) is equal to ∆uM(w) and ∆R(w, Q) is equal to
∆u
R
(w) for w ≥ wN.
From (B.43), ∆u
M
(w) = a(w − c)
(
F (pu(w))− F (qumin(w))
)
and from (B.18) that
d∆uR(w)
dw
= −aF (pu(w)) + aF (qumin(w)). Then, we have
∆u
M





for w ≥ wN (B.44)




≥ 0 at w = wN.
To show that ŵM exists and that ŵM ≥ ŵR, we examine two cases: (1) ŵR ≤ wN
and (2) ŵR > wN separately. Note that, by the definition of ŵR, ŵR ≤ wN is equivalent
to ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0, and ŵR > wN to ∆R(wN, Q) < 0.
(1) ŵR ≤ wN (equivalently, ∆R(wN, Q) ≥ 0)
Since ∆u
R
(w) is positive and increasing at w = wN, it now follows from Lemma
B.1.1(b) that the function ∆u
R






changes sign from positive to negative at w = wo ≥ wN, which in
turn implies that ∆M(w,Q) changes sign from negative to positive at w = w
o ≥ wN
(see (B.44)). Hence, ŵM = w
o and ŵM ≥ ŵR.
(2) ŵR > wN (equivalently, ∆R(wN, Q) < 0)
Recall that ∆M(w, Q) is equal to ∆
u
M




w ≥ wN. Since ŵR > wN, ∆uR(w) changes sign at w = ŵR. The result directly follows
from Lemma B.1.1(c).
Cases (1) and (2) together conclude that, if ŵR exists, then there must exist
ŵM ≥ ŵR and the result directly follows.
Proposition B.2.3. There exist two thresholds, cT and cT, cT ≤ cT, such that
(a) [Negotiation] if cT < cT, then the equilibrium sales format is negotiation with
the wholesale price w∗
N





(b) [Reconciliatory Negotiation] if cT ≤ cT < cT, then the equilibrium sales for-
mat is negotiation with the wholesale price ŵR(Q), resulting in the retailer’s cut-off
valuation q∗min(ŵR(Q), Q), and
(c) [Posted Pricing] if cT ≥ cT, then the equilibrium sales format is posted price
with the wholesale price w∗
P




Proof of Proposition B.2.3
We omit the proof of this proposition. The proof is almost identical to that of





in the earlier proof





(Q) here. The proof utilizes Lemma B.2.2
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which is a counterpart for Lemma B.1.2 used in the proof of Proposition 3.4.4.
154
B.3 Proof of Assumption A2 in Section 3.4
In this section of Appendix, we prove that Assumption A2 is satisfied for several
widely used reservation price distribution. Recall Assumption A2:
(A2) The density f(·) is twice differentiable and satisfies
f ′(x)
(
2f ′(x)F (x) + f 2(x)
)
− f ′′(x)f(x)F (x) ≥ 0 (B.45)
Uniform Distribution, U [0, a
b
]:
Note that F (x) = bx
a
, f(x) = b
a
and f ′(x) = f ′′(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, a
b
]. Therefore,
f ′(x)(2f ′(x)F (x) + f 2(x))− f ′′(x)f(x)F (x) = 0 and Assumption A2 holds trivially.
Exponential (λ):
Note that F (x) = 1− e−λx, f(x) = λe−λx, f ′(x) = −λ2e−λx and f ′′(x) = λ3e−λx
for all x ≥ 0. Then,
f ′(x)
(
2f ′(x)F (x) + f 2(x)
)
− f ′′(x)f(x)F (x)
= −λ2e−λx[−2λ2(e−λx)2 + λ2(e−λx)2]− λ4(e−λx)3 = 0,
thus Assumption A2 holds.
Weibull (α, β) with α ≥ 1:
Note that F (x) = 1 − e−(
x
β


















xα−1z + (α − 1)(α − 2)xα−3 − 2 α
βα
(α − 1)x2α−3] where z =
(α− 1)xα−2 − x2α−2 α
βα
. We have












x2α−2z − (α− 1)(α− 2) α
2
β2α

















thus, Assumption A2 holds.
Gumbel
Note that F (x) = 1
1+eα−x
, f(x) = e
α−x
(1+eα−x)2
, f ′(x) = e
α−x(eα−x−1)
(1+eα−x)3
, and f ′′(x) =
−4(eα−x)2+(eα−x)3+eα−x
(1+eα−x)4
for x ≥ 0. We have
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